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I. Introduction
With few exceptions, African states since the early 1960s' have
attempted to create an environment conducive for private foreign
direct investment (FDI).2 Since then a flurry of investment legisla-
tion has been enacted3 in hopes of attracting private foreign invest-
t The Journal wishes to thank Matthew Bender & Co. of New York, N.Y., for their
assistance.
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Ph.D., J.D., Northwestern University. The author wishes to thank the following for their
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I See, e.g., U.N. STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, INVEST-
MENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN AFRICA, U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/INR/28/Rev.2, U.N. Sales
No. 65.II.k.3 (1965). For more recent investment codes, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, 2 INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES:
AFRICA (1985) [hereinafter INVESTMENT CLIMATE].
2 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines foreign direct investment as in-
vestment made (usually by private firms, many of which are multinational corporations) to
acquire a lasting interest in a foreign enterprise with the purpose of having an effective
voice in its management. This definition also includes indirect capital contributions, such
as net loans from companies to their subsidiaries and also reinvested profits. IMF, FOR-
EIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1985) [hereinafter FOREIGN PRI-
VATE INVESTMENT]. The IMF definition does not, however, provide any guidelines as to the
percentage of foreign ownership that qualifies an investment as foreign. Flexibility seems
to be the guiding principle on this question. Some countries use ien percent foreign own-
ership as the benchmark while others more. See Cable & Persaud, New Trends and Policy in
Foreign Investment: The Experience of Commonwealth Developing Countries, in DEVELOPING WITH
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1, 18 (V. Cable & B. Persaud eds. 1987).
.3 A survey of African investment legislation since the 1960s reveals three distinct
waves or generations. The first generation of investment laws came into existence during
the 1960s and early 1970s. The prevailing mood during this period favored restrictive
policies to regulate the entry, activities, and operations of foreign investors. In the second
generation or wave of investment regimes passed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, liber-
alization of foreign investment policies was the dominant trend. The third generation of
investment laws came about after 1984 in response to the structural adjustment and stabi-
lization programs of the World Bank and the IMF. Many governments eased the restric-
tions on foreign direct investment even further by simplifying and streamlining
cumbersome and complex screening procedures and easing bureaucratic delays.
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ment.4 The belief then 5 and now6 is that such investment will spur
economic growth and development since it brings with it new scarce
resources--capital, technology, management, and marketing skills-
otherwise absent in the host nations. 7 The extent to which these in-
vestment laws and regulations have had any measurable impact on
the amount of FDI flowing into the host countries is debatable,8 but
a growing body of empirical evidence strongly suggests that prospec-
tive foreign investors see investment laws as an important barometer
for gauging the investment climate in a given country. 9 It is there-
4 For an excellent survey of the objectives of the first generation of African
investment regimes, see Dixon-Fyle, Economic Inducements to Private Foreign Investment in Af-
rica, 4J. DEV. STUD. 109 (1967).
5 This position was strongly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly
when it recommended, in 1954, "continuing efforts by both capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries . . . to stimulate the flow of private capital to the underdeveloped
countries." This resolution came out of-the recognition that the "international flow of
private investment for productive activities contributes to the raising of living standards by
assisting in the development of natural resources, the expansion and diversification of ag-
ricultural production and the growth of technical skills." G.A. Res. 824, 9 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 21) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954). A few years later the United Nations
General Assembly reaffirmed its belief that private foreign investment was critical to third
world development when it designated the 1960s as the United Nations Development Dec-
ade and issued a plea to member-states to "pursue policies which will lead to an increase
in the flow of development resources, [both] public and private, to developing countries
on mutually acceptable terms." G.A. Res. 1710, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 17, U.N.
Doc. A/5100 (1961).
6 In his 1989 New Year address, President Biya of Cameroon reiterated his govern-
ment's commitment to enlist the help of foreign investors in the economic development of
the country: "In order to increase our sphere of activity, we must continue to inspire
confidence in foreign investors. To achieve this end, we have precious assets. . . . We
need a more attractive investments code; we are working at it." Better Days Are Ahead For
Us, Cameroon Tribune, Jan. 2, 1990, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter New Year Address].
7 See FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 2. But, for a spirited debate on the
advantages and disadvantages of foreign direct investments, see C. BERSTEN, T. HORST &
T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 354, 368-69 (1978); Mo-
ran, The Future of Foreign Direct Investment in the Third World, in INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT:
NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL? 3 (T. Moran ed. 1986); Grieco, Foreign Investment and
Development: Theories and Evidence, in INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE
CAPITAL? 35 (T. Moran ed. 1986).
8 Indeed this is the focus of a forthcoming commentary. Kofele-Kale, The Political
Economy 'of Foreign Direct Investment: A Framework for Analyzing Investment Laws and Regulations
in Developing Countries (forthcoming). See also Huang, The State and Foreign Investment: The
Cases of Taiwan and Singapore, 22 CoMp. POL. STUD. 93 (1989); S. GUISINGER, INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS: PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PRO-
DUCTION, AND INVESTMENT (1985); Lessard & Hansen, Host-Government Regulations and Incen-
tives for Foreign Direct Investment, in 1 NEGOTIATING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS: A MANUAL FOR
THE THIRD WORLD § 3.1B, at 1 (R. Hellawell & D. Wallace, Jr. eds. 1982); J-M. GANKOU,
L'INVESTISSEMENT DANE LES PAYS EN DIVELOPPEMENT: LE CAS DU CAMEROUN (1985). But see
W. NDONGKO, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON: POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (1985).
Ndongko's review of foreign investments following the enactment of Cameroon's first in-
vestment code in 1960 found that in the first years of its operation, 38 firms with capital
investments of about 10.4 billion francs CFA (African Financial Community) were granted
incentives under the code. These firms were responsible for the creation of 8,000 jobs in
the country. By 1969, 133 foreign firms had invested approximately 38 billion francs CFA
accounting for 32,757 jobs. Id. at 171 passim.
9 For a sample of this recent empirical scholarship, see, e.g., S. GUISINGER, supra
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fore not surprising that lawyers who counsel private foreign enter-
prises conclude that investment laws and policy influence in varying
degrees their client's decision to invest in a particular country. Rec-
ognition of the importance of investment codes has led to a spate of
law review analyses of this ever-changing phalanx of laws' 0 as well as
the publication of primers on the legal "dos" and "don'ts" of doing
business in one developing country or another. ",
This Article gathers under one umbrella several investment laws
and regulations and subjects them to a rigorous comparative
examination.
A. The Units of Analysis
The investment regimes of Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, Kenya,
and Zaire (the "Four Darlings") are the subject of this comparative
treatment because these nations share a number of characteristics
that many foreign investors consider important in deciding where to
invest. Of their many similarities, all four governments repeatedly
profess a commitment to a market-oriented economic philosophy
and, in recent years, have actively courted foreign investors. 12 Sec-
ond, in response to prodding from the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the political leadership in these
countries has been willing to denationalize previously state-owned
enterprises.' 3 Third, all four countries have good-size domestic
note 8; Riedel, Attitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Policies of Developing Countries
Regarding Foreign Investors, 13 INDUSTRY & DEV. 1 (1984).
10 E.g., Gittleman, The Establishment and Operation of a Business Enteiprise in the Republic of
Zaire, 3 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETrLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES REVIEW-FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL (ICSID REv.-FILJ) 263 (1988); Mitchell & Gittleman, The
1986 Zairian Investment Code.- Analysis and Commentary, 2 ICSID REv.-FILJ 122 (1987); Sams,
The Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Cameroon, 17 INT'L LAW. 489 (1983).
1 E.g., TOUCHE ROSS, BUSINESS INVESTMENT AND TAXATION HANDBOOK (1989); W.
DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, CAPITAL FORMATION AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AROUND THE
WORLD, (1989); COOPERS & LYBRAND, 1990 INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES: A GUIDE FOR
PLANNING AND DECISIONS (E. Kostin ed. 1990); T. BREWER, K. DAVID, L. LIM, & R. COR-
REDERA, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A GUIDE FOR EXECUTIVES (1986) [hereinaf-
ter T. BREWER]; NEGOTIATING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS: A MANUAL FOR THE THIRD WORLD (R.
Hellawell & D. Wallace, Jr. eds. 1982); PRAC. L. INST., LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS
IN BLACK AFRICA (1981).
12 Zaire and Cameroon have recently revised their investment codes and expanded
on the benefits available under the old codes. They also maintain a wide range of bilateral
investment agreements with many West European countries. Zaire, for instance, main-
tains such agreements with France, Belgium, Switzerland, West Germany, Italy, Canada,
Denmark, and the Netherlands, and has been negotiating one with the United States. IN-
VESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 1, at 365. Cameroon signed an investment treaty with the
United States in 1984. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Aug. 3, 1984, United States-Came-
roon, reprinted in ICSID, 3 INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: TREATIES at 1984-1 (1985). It
has also entered into treaty arrangements with Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain,
West Germany, Romania, and Switzerland. INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 1, at 57.
13 All four have in the last seven years entered into structural adjustment programs
with the World Bank and/or stabilization programs with the IMF requiring privatizing a
substantial number of state-controlled enterprises. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 1,
1990]
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markets,' 4 well-educated labor forces at the primary level (less so at
the secondary and tertiary levels), and favorable conditions for a
take-off of export manufacturing and import-substitution industries.
Finally, relative to other African states, all four countries have a rec-
ord of political stability over the past twenty-five years.15 This stabil-
ity can be most reassuring to a foreign investor since investment
decisions are influenced by the investor's perception of the political
stability of a given country. 16
In sum, the economic achievements and relative political stabil-
ity of these four countries have earned them both effusive praise and
an unrelenting barrage of criticism. On one hand, their economies
are touted by the international financial community as models for
other developing African countries.' 7 The academic community,
at 167, 177, 360 passim. Since 1976, Zaire has had six stabilization plans (in 1976, 1977,
1979, 1981, 1983, and 1985). Callaghy, Absolutism, Bonapartism, and the Formation of Ruling
Classes: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, in STUDIES IN POWER AND CLASS IN AFRICA 95, 109 (I.
Makovitz ed. 1987) [hereinafter Callaghy, Zaire in Comparative Perspective].
14 As of 1986 (official mid-year estimates), the population of the Four Darlings was:
Cameroon, 10.5 million; C6te d'Ivoire, 9.7 million; Kenya, 21.2 million; Zaire, 31.5 mil-
lion. 1990 EUROPA WORLD Y.B. 609, 785, 1523, 2994.
15 All are one-party states. Cameroon's ruling and only party is the Cameroon Peo-
ples Democratic Movement, formed in 1985 as a successor to the Cameroon National
Union which came into existence in 1966. The Parti D6mocratique de ia C6te d'Ivoire has
been the ruling party in C6te d'Ivoire since 1959. Kenya has been under the spell of the
Kenyan African National Union for close to two decades. The Mouvement Populaire pour
la R6volution has held sway in Zaire since 1963. Leadership continuity and longevity are
hallmarks of these four countries: Cameroon has had two presidents since independence,
Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982) who was then succeeded by his dauphin Paul Biya (1982-);
Kenya has also had two strongmen, Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) and Arap Moi (1978-);
and C6te d'Ivoire and Zaire have each had only one president since independence,
Houphouet-Boigny for the former and Mobutu Sese Seko in the latter. Here is how one
astute student of Zairian politics describes the system in place: "Zaire is an authoritarian
state organized around a presidential monarch, Mobutu Sese Seko, who adopted the Bel-
gian colonial state structure and patrimonialized it by creating an administrative monar-
chy." Callaghy, The International Community and Zaire's Debt Crisis, in THE CRISIS IN ZAIRE:
MYTHS AND REALITIES 221 (Nzongola-Ntalaja ed. 1986) [hereinafter Callaghy, Zaire's Debt
Crisis].
16 For a discussion of this view, see, e.g., L. THUNNELL, POLITICAL RISKS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS: INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1977); Ben-
nett & Green, Political Instability as a Determinant of Direct Foreign Marketing Investment, 9 J.
MKTG. RES. 182 (1972); Y. AHARONI, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS (1966).
17 For instance, two of these countries, Cameroon and C6te d'Ivoire, have for a long
time been treated as the enfants chbis of international financiers. A 1985 U.S. Commerce
Department publication, as an example, describes Cameroon as follows:
While it may have been the smell of oil which ultimately propelled Cameroon
to near the top of the list of African countries of interest to the international
business community, this Central African nation's political stability, close ties
to the West, relatively balanced market-oriented economy, and excellent de-
velopment track record were also strong contributing factors. Some new-
found interest in Cameroon may well be relative, coming in the wake of re-
cent difficulties in previous LDC "superstars" and given that Cameroon is
only one of two West African countries to register cumulative gross domestic
product (GDP) growth over the past three years, according to the World
Bank. But Cameroon has deserved attention on its own merits as well, given
its consistent economic performance since independence 24 years ago.
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however, dismisses them as a sad collection of neo-colonial states,
INVESTMENT CUMATE, supra note 1, at 51.
For an assessment of C6te d'Ivoire, what better place to go but to a reference manual
on the climate for investment in 104 countries, relied on by international executives of
multinational corporations as well as lawyers, accountants, bankers, and independent
financiers:
With one of the highest per capita incomes of the world's developing coun-
tries, now exceeding $1,300, the Ivory Coast... today is attracting trade and
investment in increasing amounts. Annual oil revenues of $4 billion have made
this small nation about the size of New Mexico also one of the most prosperous in the
"Third World." Newly discovered offshore oil settlements place the Ivory Coast's reserves
at about 8 billion barrels, roughly the same as Algeria's proven resources. The self-
sufficiency and well-being of the people have created a stable political atmos-
phere to make the present regime the envy of most of Africa .... In view of
the economic and political unrest in neighboring African nations, many for-
eign businessmen have shifted their investing and marketing emphasis to the
Ivory Coast. The political stability of this French-speaking nation, helped by
the presence of some 8,000 French soldiers, is playing a key part in attracting
American direct investment because of the shrinking number of African
countries that can offer day-to-day business activities without disruptions
from terrorism, guerilla warfare, labor unrest or famine. The United States is
now the Ivory Coast's second largest trading partner and America 's private industry has
invested $1 billion in the country as against the $1.2 billion of French investment, the
leading suppliers of capital from abroad.
W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at Ivory Coast-I to -2 (emphasis added).
The 1985 Annual World Bank Report cited Kenya
as a most promising area for future investment and trade. The Annual Re-
port commended the Kenyan Government for cutting its external debt while
such other factors as the 5% expansion in gross national product, improve-
ment in agricultural production, pro-Western attitudes and healthy reserves
accumulated from more than 400,000 tourists annually offer American ex-
porters and investors additional incentives to help develop the nation....
This relatively politically stable nation with its modern and enterprising com-
mercial facilities and Western-oriented practices has urged members of the
American Business Association in Nairobi to take advantage of Kenya's
healthy investment climate by increasing their equity in Kenyan compa-
nies. . . .Foreign investors earned record profits and remitted handsome
dividends to parent overseas corporations in 1985 despite the fact that re-
turns have been adversely affected by certain government policies such as
price control.
W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at KI-2.
The Zairian government's long and notorious history of economic mismanagement
should have disqualified Zaire from membership in the pantheon of model African econo-
mies now reserved for Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, and Kenya. Zaire has, however, managed
to seduce the international financial community to a point where it has been all too willing
to bail out the Mobutu government during its all too frequent periods of gross financial
mismanagement crises. Professor Callaghy notes with genuine astonishment the solici-
tousness of Western financiers to Zaire's fiscal problems:
Zaire's public and publicly insured debt has ...been rescheduled by the
Paris Club countries six times (in 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1985)-
a world record. Zaire's private creditors rescheduled their part of the debt in
April 1980 and again in May 1985, and nine World Bank and Western coun-
try aid consortia meetings have been held to generate larger official assist-
ance (one in 1977, two in 1978, and one each in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982,
1983, and 1985). The World Bank has supported these efforts directly via
structural adjustment loans and technical assistance.
Callaghy, Zaire in Comparative Perspective, supra note 13, at 109 (emphasis added). See also
Callaghy, Zaire's Debt Crisis, supra note 15; Leslie, The World Bank and Zaire, in THE CRIsIs IN
ZAIRE: MYTHs AND REALTES 245 (Nzongola-Ntalaja ed. 1986). This rather servile attitude
of international financial institutions is understandable when one considers that Zaire is
the third largest country in Africa and it is endowed with vast natural resources not to
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hardly the models that should inspire admiration and emulation by
the rest of Africa, especially an Africa that must pursue a strategy of
autonomous development. 18 To critics, these liberal investment
codes and the liberal economic policies which spawned them are the
root cause of the persistent fiscal crises these countries periodically
experience, and a sobering reminder of the consequences of their
dependency on, and domination by, the West.
B. On the Logic of Comparison
Comparison as a method of inquiry is recognized as one of the
basic research tools (the others being the experimental, statistical,
and case study methods) available to the social scientist. 19 While
three of these methods search for scientific explanations, i.e., the es-
tablishment of general empirical propositions, the case study ap-
proach operates in a theoretical vacuum. 20 It is, as Professor
Lipjhart observes, "neither guided by established or hypothesized
generalizations nor motivated by a desire to formulate general hy-
potheses. ' '21 The case study, with its focus on a single country and a
mention its enormous potential market for consumer goods. It clearly is a country that
cannot be ignored for trade and investment purposes in world trade and investments.
18 For a sample, by no means representative, of critical commentaries on the eco-
nomic policies of these states, see Kofele-Kale, Cameroon and Its Foreign Relations, 80 AFR.
AFF. 197 (1981); Tunteng, External Influence and Subimperialism in Francophone West Africa, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 212 (P. Gutkind & I. Wallerstein eds.
1976); W. NDONGKO, PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A FEDERAL STATE: THE
CASE OF CAMEROON 1960-1971 (1975); M. BETI, MAIN BASSE SUR LE CAMEROUN: AUTOPSIE
D'UNE DECOLONISATION (1972) (a blistering if somewhat polemical attack on Cameroon's
liberal economic policies during the Ahidjo years); S. AMIN, LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU
CAPITALISME EN C6TE D'IVOIRE (1967); Campbell, Neo-Colonialism, Economic Dependence and
Political Change. A Case Study of Cotton and Textile Production in Ivory Coast 1960-1970, 2 REV.
AFR. POL. ECON. 36 (1975); Campbell, The Fiscal Crisis of the State in the Ivory Coast, in CON-
TRADICTIONS OF ACCUMULATION IN AFRICA 267 (B. Campbell & H. Berstein eds. 1985);
Mingst, The Ivory Coast at the Semi-Periphery of the World-Economy, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 259
(1988); Ngongo, Liberal Models of Capitalist Development in Africa: Ivory Coast, 3 AFR. DEV. 5
(1978); Woods, State Action and Class Interests in the Ivory Coast, 31 AFR. STUD. REV. 93 (1988);
A. YANSANE, DECOLONIZATION IN WEST AFRICAN STATES WITH FRENCH COLONIAL LEGACY:
COMPARISON AND CONTRAST: DEVELOPMENTS IN GUINEA, THE IVORY COAST AND SENEGAL
1945-1980 (1984); Zartman & Delgado, Introduction: Stability, Growth, and Challenge, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IVORY COAST I (I. Zartman & C. Delgado eds. 1984); C. LEYS,
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA (1975); N. SWAINSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
CAPITALISM IN KENYA 1918-77 (1980); ZAIRE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERDEVELOP-
MENT (G. Gran ed. 1979); THE CRISIS IN ZAIRE: MYTHS AND REALITIES (Nzongola-Ntalaja
ed. 1986).
19 See, e.g., Lipjhart, The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research, in COMPARA-
TIVE POLITICS IN THE POST-BEHAVIORAL ERA 54 (L. Cantori & A. Ziegler, Jr. eds. 1988);
COMPARING PUBLIC POLICIES: NEW CONCEPTS AND METHODS (D. Ashford ed. 1978); L.
MAYER, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INQUIRY: A METHODOLOGICAL SURVEY (1972); Lipjhart,
Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 682 (197 1) [hereinaf-
ter Lipjhart, Comparative Method]; A. PRZEWORSKI & H. TEUNE, THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE
SOCIAL INQUIRY (1970); Kalleberg, The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Com-
parative Study of Political Systems, 19 WORLD POL. 69 (1966).
20 See Lipjhart, Comparative Method, supra note 19, at 691.
21 Id.
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single investment code, has been the preferred methodology on re-
search on the environment for foreign private investment. This ap-
proach is rejected in this study in favor of the comparative method.
.Without minimizing the many advantages of the case method, 22
to the extent that systematic theory-building is one of the goals of
such studies, its many flaws make it most unsuitable for studies on
the climate for foreign direct investment. The focus on a single
country's investment code often leads to the conclusion that that
case study is unique and should be analyzed separately and differ-
ently from other investment codes. This hermitic vision increases
the risk of the researcher committing the historicist fallacy 23 of see-
ing the single experience as special or unique. The examination of
several investment codes, however, invariably increases our knowl-
edge about the way these codes differ among themselves.
A second problem with the one-country, one-investment code
approach is that it carries the inherent danger that conclusions based
upon this single case study will be extended to a wider cross-national
scene. An examination of C6te d'Ivoire's investment code, for exam-
ple, might lead to the conclusion that, since the country is a former
French colony and has a liberal investment code, perhaps all former
French African colonies will have comparable codes. A comparative
approach to the study of investment codes guards against such cul-
ture-bound observations and generalizations, especially if the focus
of the analysis is on comparable cases, i.e., cases that are similar in a
large number of important characteristics.2 4 This is precisely the
aim of this study: by holding as constant a number of significant
variables common to the Four Darlings, such as political stability,
economic orientation, sound economies, reasonably proper manage-
ment, and so on, the inherent differences in the various investment
codes will be revealed.
The comparative study also provides an additional dimension to
compare and evaluate countries that are putatively similar in some
important characteristics. The Four Darlings are frequently por-
trayed as neo-colonial dependent states. Comparisons with other Af-
rican states made in terms of political stability, leadership, policy
22 The great advantage of the case study approach to the study of investment climates
is that it allows for the intensive, in depth examination of a single country, a single invest-
ment code. But having said this, it bears repeating that "science is a generalizing activity.
A single case can constitute neither the basis for valid generalization nor the ground for
disproving an established generalization." Lipjhart, Comparative Method, supra note 19, at
691. 23 For a discussion of historicism and related epistemological issues in the context of
scientific inquiry, see READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (M. Brodbeck
ed. 1968); MEANING AND KNOWLEDGE, SYSTEMATIC READINGS IN EPISTEMOLOGY-(E. Nagel &
R. Brandt eds. 1965); K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959); READINGS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (M. Brodbeck & H. Feigel eds. 1953).
24 See Lipjhart, Comparative Method, supra note 19, at 687.
1990]
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continuity, and friendliness towards the West, invariably lead to the
conclusion that the investment climates of the Four Darlings are
more hospitable to foreign investors than other African countries. A
comparative examination of the investment climates in the Four Dar-
lings provides, however, a more complete and accurate basis for
comparing these countries, which might lead to an alteration of pre-
vious evaluations of the attractiveness of the environment for invest-
ment in these countries relative to the other African countries.
If the goal of comparing investment codes is the establishment
of generalizations about the climate for foreign private investments
for as wide a range of countries as possible, then this Article is a
modest step in that direction. Studies such as this can have practical
policy implications as well, illustrated by some discernible trends and
projections on the flow of foreign direct investments to the develop-
ing countries in general, and Africa in particular. Historically, Af-
rica's share of aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to
developing countries has been small. The average annual inflow of
FDI to Africa (excluding South Africa) for 1981-82 and 1983-84 was
$1.6 billion and $1.4 billion respectively. During the same periods,
Asia received $4.1 billion and $4.2 billion of FDI respectively.2 5 Af-
rica's relatively small share of FDI is in danger of disappearing alto-
gether should FDI flows be redirected to the newer and more
attractive investment opportunities that the nascent market econo-
mies of Eastern Europe provide, as many experts now predict.2 6
While Africa relies on FDI to finance economic growth and de-
velopment, this reliance comes at a time of dramatic decline of the
share of FDI in the aggregate flow of external resources from the
industrialized countries to the developing countries. Between 1967-
73 the percentage of FDI flows to developing countries was twenty-
four percent. It dropped to sixteen percent in 1974-80, and has con-
tinued to decline.2 7 In constant (1983) prices and exchange rates,
25 Goldsbrough, Investment Trends and Prospects: The Link with Bank Lending, in INVEST-
ING IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL? 173, 176 (T. Moran ed. 1986).
26 Cameroon's President Biya was among the first of many African statesmen to voice
this fear:
I would like to emphasize one important event which marked 1989 and to
which Cameroon cannot remain indifferent. I am referring to the develop-
ments in Eastern Europe. The democratization process taking place there
augurs for hope and progress. In strictly economic terms, for us Camerooni-
ans, two aspects should be considered: We may fear the economic repercussions of
such an event, for the aid granted to African countries may be reduced to the advantage of
those of Eastern Europe.
New Year Address, supra note 6, at 2 (emphasis added). See also Africans Fear Abandonment as
Attention Turns to Eastern Europe, AFR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 8.
27 See Cable & Persaud, supra note 2, at 2. But see C. OMAN, NEW FORMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1984) (arguing that FDI statistics may be
becoming increasingly irrelevant as new forms of international investment are devised,
including joint ventures, licensing agreements, production-sharing contracts, and interna-
tional subcontracting).
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the average annual flow of FDI to developing countries rose from
$7.8 billion in 1970-74 to $13.7 billion between 1975-79, but then
fell sharply to $11.1 billion in 1980-84.28
Despite a shrinking pool of resources, a World Bank report
notes that FDI still has a positive role to play in closing the gap be-
tween high and low income growth countries. 29 The difference be-
tween these two groups of countries, according to this report, is
"mirrored in, respectively, a $9 billion and $64 billion deterioration
in the current-account balance from 1985 to 1995."'30 Closing this
gap will require
increasing from $11 billion in 1985 to $19.1 billion in 1995 (in 1985
prices) in the high growth and to $14.2 billion in the low growth
scenario, these representing an annual real growth of respectively
5.7% and 2.6%. The difference between the 'high' and 'low'figures partly
reflects the response offoreign investors to higher or lower growth in developing
countries, and partly the policy orientation of host countries."1
The conclusions are inescapable. First, competition for this de-
clining pool of FDI will be fierce. Second, only those African coun-
tries that enjoy an informational advantage over their neighbors
stand any chance of surviving this competition. Third, to acquire
this needed informational advantage, countries with. foresight will
need to know a lot more about their major competitors. In the end,
a host country's ability to attract new inflows of FDI, or even to main-
tain present levels of FDI stock, will depend on its success in making
its environment much more attractive and hospitable for FDI than its
neighbors' environments. This task will be greatly furthered if the
policy-makers responsible for the drafting and implementation of in-
vestment codes have intimate knowledge of the mix of incentives be-
ing offered to foreign investors by their major competitors,
especially if these competitors have been successful in attracting a
steady flow of FDI. Finally, these developments may also present
foreign investors with a veritable embarras du choix to the extent that
they have to choose from a pool of increasingly attractive investment
options. Comparative studies that bring together under one roof a
range of investment "climates" provide the foreign investor ready
access to valuable information for quick reference. Having before
the foreign investor and the policy-maker well-executed comparative
studies of competing investment regimes makes their search and ver-
ification functions relatively painless and cost-free. Thus, resources
spent collecting and evaluating numerous investment regimes can be
put to other uses.
28 Cable & Persaud, supra note 2, at 18.
29 See id. at 5-6.
30 Id.
SI Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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II. Contrasts and Similarities in Investment Codes
The investment codes and related legislation will be analyzed
along the following dimensions:
(1) the authority responsible for supervising investments,
(2) conditions of entry and the sectors open to FDI,
(3) the monitoring and supervising of foreign businesses,
(4) ownership regulations,
(5) remittability of funds,
(6) performance requirements,
(7) tax provisions affecting investments, and
(8) rules of compensation on nationalization.
A. Patterns of Administrative Control
Government organization regarding foreign investment is a crit-
ical determinant in a country's effectiveness in attracting and con-
trolling foreign investment. 32 As Guisinger noted in his comparative
study of investment policies:
The importance of organization to competitive strategy arises from
the costs incurred by prospective foreign investors in securing gov-
ernment approvals. Many branches of government-departments of
finance, labor, and commerce-and public-sector corporations see
their interests affected by foreign investments and insist on a role in
formulating foreign investment policies and in negotiating individ-
ual entry agreements when their agency's interests are at stake. But
government attempts to involve each branch in the entry process can discourage
foreign investors."
The Four Darlings all centralize the authority for formulating invest-
ment policy in ministries that are seen as the nucleus of economic
control. In Cameroon, that authority is exercised in the Ministry of
Industry;3 4 for C6te d'Ivoire it is the Ministry of Industry;3 5 in
Kenya, the responsible authority is the Ministry of Finance;36 in
Zaire, that responsibility is shared jointly by the Commissioners of
Finance and Planning.37 ' By placing foreign investment policy-mak-
32 Guisinger, A Comparative Study of Country Policies, in INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 1, 30-31 (S. Guisinger et al. eds. 1985) [hereinafter Guis-
inger, Comparative Country Policies].
33 Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
34 Law No. 84-03 of July 4, 1984, to Institute the Investment Code of Cameroon,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETrLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID), IN-
VESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: CAMEROON 17 (1985) [hereinafter Cameroon Investment
Code]; see also Procedure for Granting Benefits of the Investment Code, Decree No. 84-
1489 of November 21, 1984, reprinted in ICSID, INVESTMENT LAws OF THE WORLD: CAME-
ROON 31 (1985) [hereinafter Cameroon Investment Decree].
35 Code des Investissements [hereinafter C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code], Law No.
84-1230, Nov. 8, 1984,Journal Officiel de la R~publique de C6te d'Ivoire (Nov. 15, 1984),
reprinted in ICSID, INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: IVORY COAST 5 (1985).
36 See Foreign Investments Protection Act of 1963, as amended, reprinted in ICSID,
INVESTMENT LAws OF THE WORLD: KENYA 1 (1984) [hereinafter Kenya Investment Act].
37 Zaire adopted a new investment code in April of 1986-Ordinance Law No. 86-028
of Apr. 5, 1986, Journal Officiel de la R6publique du Zaire (Apr. 1986) at 7, reprinted in
ICSID, INVESTMENT LAws OF THE WORLD: ZAIRE 25 (1987) [hereinafter Zaire Investment
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ing authority in one ministry, inter-ministerial rivalry for control
over investment policy is avoided. In addition, all four countries
have agencies specifically vested with authority for approving and
guiding foreign investments corresponding with national develop-
ment goals and objectives: Cameroon has the National Investment
Commission;38 CMte d'Ivoire, its External Finance and Credit Office
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (FINEX); 39 in Kenya
this agency is called the Investment Promotion Centre (IPC);40 in
Zaire, it is the Investment Commission. 4' These agencies can assist
foreign investors in dealing with government bureaucracy. 42 If and
when these institutions function as designed, 43 they can help mini-
mize the costs of securing permits and licenses, and obtain access to
public services like electricity and water.44 There are other advan-
tages for placing in the hands of one agency the authority to ex-
amine, guide, and supervise foreign investments. First, negotiations
are faster. Second, because the agency covers a wide range of nego-
tiations, it is in a position to consider the overall impact of a project
on the country, and it is able to weigh the total package of incentives
and performance requirements to determine what is needed to at-
tract a desired investor. Finally, a single agency is more likely to give
Code]. This Code replaced the old Code of 1979. The 1986 Code is reproduced in Eng-
lish translation in 2 ICSID REv.-FILJ 237 (1987). For an in-depth discussion of the new
investment code, see Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 10.
38 See Cameroon Investment Decree, supra note 34, arts. 4, 11-21.
39 FINEX approves all investments from outside the Franc Zone. See U.S. Dep't of
State, 1990 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT AND INVESTMENT DATA UPDATE FOR COTE
D'IvOIRE 6 (1988) [hereinafter INVESTMENT CLIMATE UPDATE]. Concerning the Franc Zone,
see infra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
40 The IPC is under the Ministry of Finance. See BuSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., 1
INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADING CONDTIONS ABROAD: KENYA 15 (1990) [hereinafter
ILT KENYA].
41 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, arts. 4(d), 35.
42 See Guisinger, Comparative Country Policies, supra note 32, at 32-33.
43 Cumbersome and time consuming are the two most frequently heard complaints
about investment approval procedures in most of Africa. With unusual candor, the
Kenyan government made the following admission:
[I]nvestors do require as many as 30 specific approvals, for everything from
the purchase of land to work permits for expatriates and the importation of
capital goods. Many of these are necessary, but the delays in obtaining them are
not. The process of gaining Government approvalfor an investment can take as long as
three years, itself a strong deterrent to investors.
Sessional Paper No. I of 1986 On Economic Management For Renewed Growth § 6.28 at
99 (Kenya) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1986 Sessional Paper]. The Government then
decided to take steps to "simplify, coordinate and shorten the process of investor approv-
als." Id. The result was the Investment Promotion Center, but critics charge that this
Center, which was intended to be used by investors for assistance with all necessary ap-
provals, has barely been functioning. See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 15; see also Thurow,
Capital Flight Strains Kenyan Economy, Wall St.J., Aug. 17, 1989, at AI0, col. 1. This prob-
lem is not unique to Kenya. Ngongi, for example, cites the case of Cameroon where "it
takes an average of 289 days for a foreign investor to go through all the formalities of
setting up an undertaking." Ngongi, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Cameroon, 1, 9
(forthcoming).
44 Guisinger, Comparative Country Policies, supra note 32, at 33.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
deference to precedent in its negotiations and decisions which pro-
vides a predictable pattern of results. 45
B. Entry Control
A private foreign entity contemplating investment in any of the
four countries must first obtain approval from the state agency re-
sponsible for investments. In the case of Cameroon, recommenda-
tion for placement under one of the investment schedules is made by
the National Investments Commission (NIC) or one of its subsidiary
bodies. 46 The NIC is the sole authority which reviews applications to
be treated under priority schedules. It may reject or approve an ap-
plication according to the criteria specified in the Code. C6te
d'Ivoire's External Finance and Credit Office of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Finance (FINEX) is the agency charged under the
Ivorian Investment Code with approving all investments from
outside the franc zone, including capital contributions, capital alloca-
tions or loans, licensing, and technical assistance contracts. A for-
eign investor can bypass FINEX entirely and negotiate an ad hoc
investment agreement with the Ivorian government, 47 but this pro-
cedure is reserved for priority enterprises.48 In Kenya, a foreign na-
tional seeking to invest must obtain a certificate from the Ministry of
Finance (the "Ministry"). 49 The Ministry will issue a Certificate of
Approved Enterprise when it is satisfied that the enterprise would
further the economic development of, or would be of benefit to,
Kenya. 50 Although foreign investors who have already invested for-
eign assets in Kenya are entitled to the grant of a certificate of ap-
proval, the certificate may be withheld by the Minister of Finance
(the "Minister") if he is not satisfied with the benefit to Kenya from
the investment. 51 The Minister may "make regulations or give direc-
tions generally for the better carrying out of the purposes of this Act
and prescribing the manner in which applications shall be made for
certificates under this Act, and the information which shall accom-
pany those applications. ' 52 In Zaire the gatekeeper to foreign in-
45 See Encarnation & Wells, Evaluating Foreign Investment, in INVESTING IN DEVELOP-
MENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL? 61, 73 (T. Moran ed. 1985).
46 Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 19.
47 C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 22, provides that foreign enter-
prises that make investments of "exceptional" economic and social interest to the develop-
ment of the country may negotiate an investment agreement with the government.
Among other things, this agreement must stipulate the controls that the government may
exercise on the enterprise. Id. art. 23. Those controls could include entry controls. These
ad hoc agreements can also be negotiated by foreign enterprises making capital invest-
ments in Ivorian companies. Id. art. 25.
48 Id. art. 11.
49 Kenya Investment Act, supra note 36, § 3(1).
50 Id. § 3(2).
51 Id. § 3(3).
52 Id. § 9.
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vestment is the Executive Council, but only for certain types of
investments. In practice, however, all foreign investments must re-
ceive approval from the President of the Republic. 53
Entry controls are dealt with indirectly in two of the countries: 54
through investment schedules in Cameroon,55 and through prefer-
ential regimes in Zaire. Benefits for foreign investors under the
Cameroon Investment Code are divided into four schedules: the spe-
cial undertakings schedule (Schedule A);56 the priority undertakings
schedule (Schedule B); 57 the small- and medium-sized undertakings
schedule (Schedule C);58 and the schedule of undertakings governed
by convention (Schedule D). 59 Approval under any one of these
schedules is governed by technical criteria and by a procedure fixed
by regulation. 6° Zaire's Investment Code, much like Cameroon's,
establishes three preferential regimes: the General Regime, the Con-
ventional Regime, and the Industrial Free Zone Regime. 61 These re-
gimes apply to both new investments and investments made by
existing enterprises. 62 Entry into any one of these preferential re-
gimes requires a determination of the contribution of the investment
to the country's economic and social development. 63 This contribu-
tion is appraised under the objectives prescribed by the Executive
53 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 37; Gittleman, supra note 10, at 277.
54 In the Ivorian case, all private investments are freely allowed subject only to regu-
lations for the protection of public health and social and economic order. C6te d'Ivoire
Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 7. Furthermore, it is clear that the Ivory Coast Invest-
ment Code applies equally to Ivorian and foreign enterprises and persons. Id. arts. 1 & 5.
55 See Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, arts. 22-35.
56 The minimum qualification under this schedule is an investment during the term
of the schedule of not less than 500 million francs CFA; location of the business in a
border region or in an area where access and supply conditions are particularly difficult or
engagement in an activity that yields a high value added; and a commitment to give prefer-
ence to the use of adapted technologies, to utilize a large number of skilled local workers,
and to guarantee the availability of continuing vocational training. See Ngongi, supra note
43, at 10.
57 A minimum investment of 250 million francs CFA is required before a foreign
business is approved under this schedule. In addition, the business must either be located
in a non-port border area or contribute in "a considerable and long-lasting way to an
improvement in the balance of payments in its sector or activity" or "have a very high
value added." The business must also encourage subcontracting with other companies or
give preferential treatment to technologies that employ a large number of skilled local
labor with guarantees of their continued vocational training. d. at 11.
58 Sixty-five percent of the equity in a Schedule C business must be owned by Camer-
oonians. A business qualifying under this schedule must be willing to invest a minimum of
500 million francs CFA at prices on the date of the enactment of the Cameroon Invest-
ment Code. It must also guarantee continuing vocational training for its workers and its
"job-creating expenses must be relatively low." Id.
59 Schedule D enterprises are those which operate in areas of activity determined by
the government to be of strategic importance in the implementation of the government's
economic, social, and cultural development program. Id.
60 id. at 12-13; see also Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 14(3).
61 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 2.
62 Id. art. 3.
63 Id. art. 2.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Council on the basis of general criteria of economic and financial
profitability. 64 Article 4 provides that "[e]conomic profitability is ap-
praised according to the advantages the investment offers to the
overall Zairean economy," and lists specific factors that are consid-
ered, 65 including the magnitude of the investment, cost of the prod-
uct, effect of the investment on the country's balance of payments
and the social environment, number of jobs created, place of the in-
vestment, and the transfer of technology which will take place.66 Re-
quests for admission into any of these regimes must be submitted to
the Department of Planning for onward transmission to the Invest-
ment Commission which prepares an official report, and together
with a recommendation on the project, forwards it to the Commis-
sioner for Planning. The latter then informs the Commissioner of
Finance and the Executive Council (only for investments under the
Conventional Regime) of the conclusions reached by the Investment
Commission.67
A foreign enterprise seeking to benefit 68 from the General Re-
gime must meet three conditions. First, a minimum capital invest-
ment of ten million zaires 69 is required, subject to revision by
Presidential Ordinance.70 Second, if the promoters are all foreign-
ers, at least eighty percent of the total investment must be financed
by foreign sourced funds, thirty percent of which must be equity in-
vestment.7' Finally, total debt payable in five years or less cannot
exceed thirty percent of the investment.72 Approval is granted
under this regime by a joint decree issued by the Commissioners of
Planning and Finance, and becomes effective upon approval by Pres-
idential Ordinance. 73 Articles 22-25 provide special rules for admis-
sion for small- and medium-sized enterprises or industries which do
not have to meet the ten million zaires minimum required of enter-
prises under the General Regime.74
64 Id. art. 4.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. arts. 35-37.
68 See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
69 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 7. As of March 1, 1987, the official rate
of exchange was approximately 85 zaires to U.S. $1. An investment of ten million zaires
was worth approximately U.S. $118,000. See Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 10, at 129
n.37.
70 Under the Zairian legislative process, Ordinance Laws (ks Ordonnance Lois) are
promulgated by the President of the Republic in his capacity as a legislator. CONSTrnrLON
DE LA RtPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE art. 43. However, Ordinance Laws may only be issued when
the Legislative Council is not in session and in cases of emergency. Id. The President of
the Republic, in his capacity as executive, may pass regulations called Ordonnances (Ordi-
nances) implementing an Ordinance Law. Id. art. 45. See Gittleman, supra note 10, at 264.
71 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 7.
72 Id.
73 Id. art. 37.
74 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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To qualify for the Conventional Regime, the foreign investor
must satisfy the conditions for admission to the General Regime and
more. Article 28 provides that an enterprise which would otherwise
qualify for the General Regime can opt for the more generous Con-
ventional Regime if it is deemed of major interest to the economic
and social development of the country and characterized by its ex-
ceptional magnitude-evaluated at 500 million zaires 75 or more--or
by its long term viability. 76 If these two conditions are satisfied, the
promoters may request that the Executive Council place their enter-
prise in the Conventional Regime. 77 Admission to the Conventional
Regime is for a maximum period of ten years. 78
Industrial Free Zones have been established in both Zaire and
Cameroon. Zaire's Industrial Free Zone Regime (Zone Franche d Voca-
tion Industrielle or ZOFI) was established in 1981 to attract foreign
investments to the free zone of Inga that would take advantage of the
port facilities and relatively cheap electricity. 79 To date no foreign
investors have taken the Zairian Government up on this offer.80
Cameroon's Industrial Free Zone (CIFZ or the "Free Zone") was es-
tablished in 1990 to promote new investments, facilitate export de-
velopment, and create new jobs.81 Goods enter and leave the Free
Zone duty-free, 82 and in return, all goods produced in the Free Zone
must be exported 83 and an enterprise must have, within five years
from the date of commencement of operations, a work-force of
which at least eighty percent are Cameroonians.8 4 Under the Free
Zone Regime, enterprises operating in CIFZ receive complete ex-
emption from corporate income tax for ten years, a cap on corporate
tax in subsequent years of fifteen percent,8 5 tax-free and duty-free
importation of machinery, raw materials, and supplies,8 6 and exemp-
tion from import and export duties. 87
75 Approximately U.S. $5.9 million at a rate of exchange of 85 zaires to U.S. $1. See
Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 11, at 134 n.56.
76 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 28.
77 Id.
78 Id. art. 29. Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Code, the duration of the Conven-
tional Regime was unlimited. See Ordinance Law No. 81-010 of Apr. 2, 1981, reprinted in
ICSID, INVESTMENT LAws OF THE WORLD: ZAIRE 59 (1987); see also Gittleman, supra note 10,
at 275 n.101.
79 Ordinance Law No. 81-010 of Apr. 2, 1981, reprinted in ICSID, INVESTMENT LAws
OF THE WORLD: ZAIRE 59 (1987) (creating the ZOFI regime); Ordinance No. 81-066 of
Apr. 30, 1981, reprinted in ICSID, INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: ZAIRE 79 (1987) (creat-
ing the administrative framework for ZOFI).
80 See Gittleman, supra note 10, at 276.
81 Ordinance No. 90/001 of Jan. 29, 1990, to Establish the Free Zone Regime in
Cameroon [hereinafter Free Zone Regime].
82 Id. art. 18.
83 Id. art. 26(a)(3).
84 Id. art. 26(a)(2).
85 Id. arts. 15, 16(a).
86 Id. art. 18(b).
87 Id. art. 18(c).
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C. Monitoring of Business Operations
Under Cameroon's Investment Code, all approved foreign en-
terprises are subject to inspection and control by the Ministry in
charge of industry"8 and by the customs authority.89 The Ministry in
charge of industry ensures that foreign enterprises granted benefits
under the code comply with commitments made in the approval doc-
ument or the establishment convention.9" This document includes
the enterprise's commitments to the State and other special obliga-
tions, the terms and conditions of the specific control to which the
enterprise shall be subject, and the penalties provided for failure to
meet these commitments. 9' A foreign enterprise granted benefits
under the Investment Code is required to forward to the Ministry in
charge of industry its annual report of activities and its balance sheet
and accounts three months following the end of its fiscal year. The
balance sheet and accounts must be certified by a professionally
qualified accountant licensed with the Central African Customs and
Economic Union (UDEAC).92
Approved foreign enterprises are also subject to inspections
conducted during business hours by officials from the Ministry in
charge of industry, who upon presentation of a warrant may ask to
see documents relating to the enterprise's activity from all industrial
undertakings, demand and receive copies of documents which they
consider necessary for the accomplishment of their mission, and
without the need for the presence of a judicial police officer, have
free access to any place used for industrial and commercial purposes
by the enterprise. 93 Any violation of the control and inspection pro-
visions of the Investment Code is punishable either by a fine or com-
plete withdrawal of approval.94
Article 13 of the Ivorian Code contains the key provisions for
monitoring foreign business operations. To qualify as a priority en-
terprise, the investor must submit an application supported by all
relevant legal, technical, and economic documentation related to the
project.95 In addition, the application must contain the firm's com-
mitment to comply with national or international quality standards
applicable to the goods or services in question.96 The firm must also
comply with applicable legislative regulations and generally accepted
88 Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 6. The manner of exercise of this
control is determined by regulations.
89 Id. art. 18.
90 Id. art. 20(1).
91 Id. arts. 16, 32.
92 Id. art. 37.
93 Id. art. 41.
94 Id. art. 43.
95 C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 13.
96 Id.
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principles and procedures. 97 Furthermore, the firm must furnish the
necessary information to monitor compliance with the agreed
obligations.98
Responsibility for ensuring the performance of the investment
agreement rests with the Ministry of Industry.99 Failure of an inves-
tor to perform according to the terms of the agreement may result in
the forfeiture of the benefits, although a reasonable time for correc-
tive action is allowed.100 For projects of exceptional economic and
social significance, an investment agreement must be negotiated with
the government.' 0 ' Such an agreement must set forth the purpose,
content, geographical location, and time of performance of the in-
vestment program.' 0 2 In addition, small- and medium-sized compa-
nies that wish to apply for benefits under the Code must present an
investment program of an amount fixed by decree.10 3 These compa-
nies are required to maintain an accounting system' 04 and to comply
with other requirements spelled out in Article 3.
Kenya's investment code provides that every certificate shall
contain, among other things, the amount of the foreign assets in-
vested or to be invested by the certificate holder as divided between
capital, expressed in Kenyan currency, and any debt, expressed
either in Kenyan currency or the relevant foreign currency.' 0 5 The
certificate must also contain "such other matters as may be necessary
or desirable for the purposes of [the] Act.' 106 All declared foreign
assets must be invested in the approved enterprise within the ap-
proved period or the certificate shall be deemed to have been
revoked. 10 7
The Zairian Code is somewhat vague with regard to the moni-
toring of foreign business operations, but Articles 39 through 41 set
forth the duties of an enterprise admitted to one of the regimes of
the Code. An admitted enterprise must, among other things, under-
take to keep regular and thorough accounts in the form required by
law, to submit to any supervision or inspection by an authorized ad-
ministrative bodye, and to respond within the required time to all
questionnaires and requests for statistical information. 10 8 While it is
expected that all approved foreign investors will respect the laws of
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. art. 15.
100 Id.
101 Id. art. 22.
102 Id. art. 23.
103 Id. art. 3.
104 Id.
105 Kenya Investment Act, supra note 36, art. 3(4)(a)-(c).
106 Id. art. 3(4)(f).
107 Id. art. 5.
108 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 39.
1990]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the host country, Article 39 particularly emphasizes respect of Zaire's
exchange control laws. 109
An investor may substantially modify his investment program" 0
provided the investor informs the Commission that is authorized to
examine enterprise proposals and, further, that it submits to the
State Commissioners of Finance and Planning an approved revision
of its obligations and incentives."I ' In this respect, Zaire's Code is
the most flexible of the four countries. In the event the enterprise
defaults on a commitment, the State Commissioner of Planning, af-
ter notifying the Investment Commission, will summon the enter-
prise to remedy the stated deficiencies."t 2 If the summons is not
acted upon, the approval will be withdrawn or notice of termination
issued. 113
D. Local Ownership Regulations
Typical local ownership requirements operate as a form of pro-
tection of domestic capital and as a tax on foreign-controlled busi-
nesses.114 The Investment Codes of Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, and
Zaire impose no specific local ownership requirements. No require-
ment, for example, will be found in these codes for foreign and do-
mestic equity interest to be split in any particular ratio, so a foreign
corporate or individual investor is free to hold all of the equity inter-
est in any of these countries. Zaire, however, requires an enterprise
with all foreign promoters seeking to benefit from the General Re-
gime to finance at least eighty percent of the total investment from
foreign-sourced funds."15 Presumably this requirement will be re-
109 This requirement represents a slight departure from the 1979 Investment Code,
and two legal practitioners have questioned whether it is all that necessary given that all
investors are expected, as a matter of course, to observe all the laws of Zaire not just those
dealing with exchange controls. For this and other criticisms of the Zairian Code, see
Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 10, at 137.
110 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 39.
111 Id.
112 Id. art. 42.
113 Id.
114 Such requirements (1) allow local investors to share in rents generated by foreign
companies; (2) help to stimulate the development of the local capital markets; (3) in the
process strengthen the local entrepreneurial sector; and (4) protect domestic capital while
taxing foreign-owned enterprises. Lessard & Hansen, supra note 8, at § 3.1 B, at 9-10. The
requirement for shared ownership also has a downside to it as Lessard and Hansen point
out in the following passage:
In those cases where the global financial and informational integration of the
MNC (Multi-National Corporation) provide substantial advantages over in-
dependent units (i.e., reduced costs), other things being equal, shared own-
ership requirements will tend to constrain and discourage such international
integration. Thus, this regulatory measure has the associated cost of dis-
couraging those ventures involving extensive international integration and
allowing the developing countries to specialize in a limited stage of
production.
Id.
115 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 7.
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laxed if one of the promoters is a national of Zaire.
Kenya's Investment Code does not expressly restrict the share
of any enterprise that can be owned by a foreign investor, though in
practice a foreign investor's access to local financing is conditioned
on the enterprise's percentage of local ownership." l6 Recently an-
nounced government policy may make local participation an impor-
tant consideration as a foreign investor decides whether or not to
invest in that country. 17 In 1986 the government of President Arap
Moi introduced a series of policy changes to encourage the localiza-
tion of ownership and control of industrial and commercial enter-
prises."18 Henceforth, foreign investors will be required to operate
through a joint venture with a Kenyan partner who must have con-
trolling interest, but it is unclear how and when the majority owner-
ship ruling will be applied since clear guidelines have not been
issued. According to press reports, the government has promised to
accelerate the phase-out of the large expatriate workforce and to es-
tablish a task force to supervise the handing over of enterprises to
African Kenyans.1 9 Whether a similar fate as befell Zaire's national-
ization policy awaits Kenya's recently enacted indigenization policy is
yet to be seen. 20
E. Sectors Open to FDI
A few developing countries allow foreign private participation in
all sectors of the economy, but far more bar FDI in those sectors that
116 For firms engaged in manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism, local borrowing
may not exceed the following percentages of share capital plus unimpaired reserves and
foreign loans:
Equity Ownership Local Borrowing Limit
Less than 40% Kenyan citizens 20%
40-50% Kenyan citizens 40%
Over 50% Kenyan residents 40%
Over 50% Kenyan citizens 60%
Over 85% Kenyan residents No restrictions
See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 16.
117 For a brief analysis of these policy changes, see Rweyemamu, Foreign Investment
Policy: Kenya's Experience, in DEVELOPING WITH FOREIGN INVESTMENT 260, 278-79 n.6 (V.
Cable & B. Persaud eds. 1987).
118 Under earlier legislation passed in 1984, insurance companies must be one-third
Kenyan-owned. See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 6.
119 Id.
120 A government can pursue a policy of indigenization without actually wresting con-
trol of the economy from the clutches of foreign investors. That is, the transfer of legal
ownership to host country nationals does not effectively terminate the control non-nation-
als have over their investments. For a trenchant analysis of this tension between local and
international capital in the context of Nigeria's indigenization programs, see Biersteker,
Indigenization and the Nigerian Bourgeoisie: Dependent Development in an African Context, in THE
AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA, KENYA, AND THE IVORY COAST
249 (P. Lubeck ed. 1987).
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are considered politically sensitive (e.g., utilities, banking, insurance,
media, oil exploration and exploitation) or are reserved for indige-
nous entrepreneurs (e.g., distribution of goods, retail trade, etc.).1 21
The relatively few entry restrictions imposed by the countries ex-
amined here, however, are not particularly burdensome. In Came-
roon, for example, with the exception of the banking, insurance, and
oil industries where there is a 33.3% local participation require-
ment,' 22 and public utilities which are generally reserved for state-
owned companies, no sector of business activity is restricted to na-
tionals. 123 This apparent solicitousness toward foreign investors is
justified on the ground of economic necessity and the unavailability
of local capital and technology:
[I]ncentives granted in the Investment Code... are directed at indi-
viduals and/or corporate bodies with, or with access to, substantial
capital and modem technological facilities and know-how.... Since
not many Cameroonians dispose of such facilities, there is no doubt
that the government attaches great importance to the involvement
of foreil, investors in the economic development of this
country. 14
The Ivorian government has reserved for itself utilities, public
railroads, bus and airline transportation, local refining of petroleum,
121 See G. PFEFFERMAN, PRIVATE BUSINESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28 (1988).
122 TOUCHE Ross, supra note 11, at Cameroon-2.
123 Id. Article 26 of the Cameroon Investment Code makes specific reference to local
ownership. It provides that one of the requirements for an enterprise to benefit under
Schedule C for small- and medium-sized undertakings is that at least 65% of the share
capital be held by Cameroonians. Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 26.
124 Ngongi, supra note 43, at 10. In an effort to promote local entrepreneurship, the
government has established a number of public institutions to provide credit and guidance
to local enterprises. The Cameroon Development Bank or Banque de Diveloppement Camer-
ounaise (BCD) was created in 1960 to finance projects in line with economic and social
development objectives. The National Investment Corporation or Sociti Nationale
d'Investissement (SNI) was established in 1964 as a kind of merchant bank for financing and
promoting joint ventures in partnership with the government. The National Centre for
the Assistance of Small- and Medium-Size Undertakings or Centre National dAssistance aux
Petites t Moyennes Enterprises (CAPME) was created in 1970 to "provide artisanal enterprises
with industrial and commercial character by coordinating the actions of business undertak-
ings and to promote indigenous capital accumulation." Ndongko, The Political Economy of
Development in Cameroon: Relations Between the State, Indigenous Business, and Foreign Investors, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAMEROON 83, 105 (M. Schatzberg & W. Zartman eds. 1986)
[hereinafter Ndongko, Cameroon Political Economy]. The National Fund for Rural Develop-
ment or Fonds National de Diveloppement Rural (FONADER) is a farmers' bank to provide
credit to development projects located in rural areas. Ndongko makes the telling point
that "[i]n spite of [these] ... institutions and credit facilities, indigenous businessmen
continued to have difficulties in obtaining loans." Ndongko, Cameroon Political Economy,
supra, at 110. The failure of these institutions prompted the government to establish yet
another agency, the Aid and Loan Guarantee Fund for Small- and Medium-Size Undertak-
ings or Fonds dAide et de Garantie des Cridits aux Petites et Moyennes Enterprises (FOGAPE),
authorized to direct aid to small indigenous businesses in the form of training, advice, and
guaranteed bank loans. Both FONADER and FOGAPE have recently been replaced with
two newly established banking institutions: the former is now the Agricultural Credit Bank
and the successor to the latter is the Commercial Credit Bank. See New Year Address,
supra note 6, at 1.
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and cigarette production. 25 Articles 1 and 5 of the Ivorian Code
state that guarantees and benefits provided under the regime apply
to domestic as well as foreign persons or entities, but while not re-
quired by the Code, local Ivorian participation can be helpful in set-
ting up and conducting business.' 2 6  Article 25 indicates that
investments by foreign firms in state-owned business enterprises may
qualify for benefits under the Code.
Entry restrictions in Kenya are tied to the government's in-
digenization policy. 12 7 In keeping with this policy, the Kenyan gov-
ernment bars the entry of foreign, investments in such activities as
utilities and large-scale ownership of land for farming and ranch-
ing;' 2 8 FDI entry into other sectors, such as insurance and trad-
ing, 2 9 is regulated by requiring some percentage of local ownership.
F. Remittability of Funds
Two kinds of regulations are included under this heading: (1)
foreign exchange restrictions on the transfer of funds from the host
capital-importing country to the capital-exporting country; and (2)
restrictions on payments for foreign services, including royalties and
fees for foreign technology, management services, and the like. The
provisions relating to repatriation of capital and profits in the invest-
ment laws of the four countries reflect two approaches: one approach
followed by Cameroon, CMte d'Ivoire, and Zaire places no restric-
tions in remittances of profits and capital except for the procedural
requirement of permission for exchange-which is routinely
granted. The second approach, followed by Kenya, requires certain
conditions to be met before capital and profits can be repatriated.
1. Foreign Exchange Controls
Typically, exchange control problems are encountered when
foreign investors want to convert local currencies into hard (i.e.,
freely exchangeable) currency, such as U.S. Dollars, Deutsche Marks,
Pounds Sterling, or French Francs, in order to remit earnings or
make other payments back to their home countries. The host gov-
125 W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at Ivory Coast-16.
126 See INVESTMENT CLIMATE UPDATE, supra note 39, at 6. This, however, applies only
to non-priority enterprises.
127 A similar policy of nationalization of all foreign businesses was pursued by the
Zairian government in the early 1970s. Between 1973 and 1974 the government of
Mobutu Sese Seko turned over to Zairian nationals or the state virtually all foreign-run
commercial activities in the country. The following activities were restricted to Zairian
nationals: import, export, transit, wholesale, retail, and services determined to be commer-
cial by law. Faced with the imminent collapse of its commercial infrastructure, the govern-
ment was forced to retreat from this hasty program of indigenization. These laws were
subsequently rescinded in 1977. See Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 10, at 128.
128 See, e.g., ILT KENYA, supra note 39, at 6.
129 Id.
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ernment may prevent such transfer of funds through preferential ex-
change rates for particular kinds of transactions, outright
prohibitions of payment of royalties, or simply bureaucratic de-
lays.' 30 Regardless of form, constraints on foreign exchange should
be embraced with great caution. First, foreign investors view them
with some alarm since, from their vantage point, these restrictions
usually have a general impact on other restrictions and regulations.
For example:
[Rlate of return regulation is most often applied through ceilings on
allowed-profit remittances, local sourcing requirements are enforced
by denying access to foreign exchange, etc .... [F]oreign exchange
restrictions. have a general impact since they affect all firms engaged
in international trade. Further, although the effects of limits on in-
vestment and credit flows would appear to be specific to foreign
firms ... such restrictions will often have an even stronger effect on
domestic firms.' 13
Government restriction of foreign investors' access to foreign
exchange is usually in response to severe financing or debt repay-
ment problems as well as a "substantial and continuing balance of
payments deficit. . .'. When a country faces such a balance of pay-
ments situation, it must allow its currency to devalue, draw upon its
foreign exchange reserves, or adopt internal policy restraints on the
economy."' 3 2 If the primary objective of enlisting FDI is to help the
government solve its balance-of-payments difficulties,' 33 then that
government soon finds itself in simultaneous pursuit of two contra-
dictory policies. An attractive investment climate is one where the
foreign investor enjoys the freedom to remit profits and dividends
and repatriate capital. Yet combatting a balance-of-payments crisis
requires the establishment of temporary exchange restrictions and
controls. The net effect of pursuing conflicting policy goals is the
increased risk that foreign investors will simply move to more salu-
brious investment climes.134 Of course, these conflicting objectives
can be reconciled, as some have suggested, "through export projects
in which the foreign investors are allowed to retain a portion of for-
eign-exchange earnings abroad."' 35
130 Id. at 11-12.
131 Lessard & Hansen, supra note 8, § 3.1B at 76-77.
132 T. BREWER, supra note 11, at 222; see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES 42 (1987).
133 For instance, the Cameroon Government makes it quite clear that admission into
the Priority Undertakings Schedule B will be based on whether the foreign investment is
likely to "contribute in a considerable and long-lasting way to an improvement in the bal-
ance of payments in[its] sector of activity." Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34,
art. 24.
134 Indeed Kenya's strict exchange controls may invite this effect. For a critique of
these regulations, see Rweyemamu, supra note 117.
135 See Cable & Persaud, supra note 2, at 13.
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The investment codes of Cameroon, i3 6 C6te d'Ivoire,1 7 and
Zaire' 38 impose fewer restrictions on access to foreign exchange
than does Kenya. Under the laws and regulations of these three
countries foreign investors may transfer capital and profits. The
membership of Cameroon and C6te d'Ivoire in the Franc Zone guar-
antees the availability of foreign exchange and unlimited convertibil-
ity of the CFA13 9 franc with the French franc at a fixed rate,' 40
providing considerable monetary stability and simplifying the prob-
lem of international payments by foreign investors. 141 In both coun-
tries, prior authorization from the Ministry of Finance (Cameroon)
or the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (C6te d'Ivoire) is
required for most transfers outside the Franc Zone.' 42 They also re-
quire investments from outside the Franc Zone to be declared. 143
Provided these requirements are met and the taxes on dividends
have been paid, it is not difficult to move funds out Of the country. 144
Kenya's exchange control policy, by way of contrast, makes it
difficult for foreign investors to repatriate their profits. Although
Kenya remains the most industrialized country in East Africa, its
growth in the manufacturing sector has been curtailed because of
restricted foreign exchange for raw material imports.' 45 This for-
eign exchange shortage has drastically limited profit repatriation.
Acquisitions and reinvestments, however, are not restricted.
Article 6 of the Kenya Investment Act provides that foreign in-
436 Cameroon's exchange control regulations have been described as dated and not
reflective of the economic and political realities of the country. Ngongi does not exactly
say what these realities are and how the foreign exchange regulations have proved to be
unresponsive. He does, of course, mention that proposals for reforming these regulations
hive been made and are pending. Ngongi, supra note 43, at 18.
. 137 Article 9 of the Ivorian Code makes it clear that foreign businesses may repatriate
to their country of origin the earnings and proceeds from liquidation of capital invest-
ments made in foreign currencies. C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 9.
138 Zaire's Investment Code guarantees foreign enterprises freedom of transfers asso-
ciated with investment operations subject only to restrictions where necessary. Zaire In-
vestment Code, supra note 37, art. 31.
139 CFA stands for Communauti Financire Africaine (African Financial Community).
140 The Franc Zone groups together former French colonies in Africa whose currency,
the CFA franc, is linked to the French franc. This link with France provides considerable
stability to the CFA franc. For a detailed discussion on the structure of the Franc Zone,
see, e.g., J. BOURDIN, MONNAIE ET POLrrIQUE MONCTAIRE DANS LES PAYS AFRICAINS DE LA
ZONE FRANC (1982); P. GuILLAUMONT & S. GuILLAUMONT, ZONE FRANC ET DEVELOPPEMENT
AFRICAIN (1984); Kahler, International Response to Economic Crisis: France and the Third World in
the 1970s, in FRANCE IN A TROUBLED WORLD ECONOMY 76 (S. Cohen & P. Gourevitch eds.
1982); P. ROBSON, INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND EQurry: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
WEST AFRICA (1983); see also J. WILSON, FRENCH BANKING STRUCTURE AND CREDIT POLICY
103-33 (1957).
141 See, e.g., Ngongi, supra note 43, at 18.
142 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES, IVORY COAST 9 (1988).
143 See INVESTMENT CLIMATE UPDATE, supra note 39, at 6, 8.
144 Id.
145 See INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 1, at 177.
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vestors must comply with the requirements of the Exchange Control
Act. ' 46 It further provides that the enterprise has repatriation rights
in the approved foreign currency and at the prevailing official rates
of exchange with respect to: (1) after-tax profits arising from or out
of its investment of foreign assets, including retained profits which
have not been capitalized; (2) the capital, i.e., the original book value
of the investment specified in the certificate as representing the orig-
inal equity investment of the holder of the certificate plus any re-
tained earnings which have not been capitalized; and (3) the
principal and interest of any loan specified in the certificate.' 47
Under Kenya law all subsequent investments after the initial partici-
pation, as well as for reinvested earnings, must be submitted for a
new certificate and for permission to repatriate future capital and
earnings. 148 Foreign investors have generally objected to this
provision. 149
A foreign enterprise seeking to exercise these repatriation rights
must obtain exchange control approval. For holders of Certificates
of Approved Enterprises, approval to transfer profits and dividends
is automatic,' 50 but foreign companies willing to reinvest some of
their earnings in the country are likely to receive more favorable
treatment than those investors who do not.' 5 '
2. Restrictions on Payments for Technical Services
In addition to restricting access to foreign exchange, host gov-
ernments can also restrict the kinds of earnings that a foreign inves-
tor can repatriate. Such restrictions serve to. give preferential
treatment to local suppliers of technology and other services, and to
prevent the use of transfer-pricing mechanisms' 52 for payment of
services within the multinational firm.' 53
146 Kenya Investment Act, supra note 36, art. 6.
147 Id. art. 7.
148 See W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at Kenya-12 to -13.
149 Id. The Ministry of Finance has lobbied unsuccessfully to have it relaxed.
150 See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 12.
151 Id.
152 Transfer pricing has been defined as the "practice whereby the MNE [multina-
tional enterprise], in its intraenterprise transactions, can sometimes effectively modify the
tax base on which its entities are assessed, or possibly avoid exchange controls, by 'doing
business' within the MNE corporate structure itself, so as to reallocate costs and revenues
in such a way that its profits are realized where the tax and exchange environment is most
favorable." C. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 127 (1982);
see also Note, Regulation of Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporations: An International Perspec-
tive, 10 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 67 (1977).
153 See, e.g., Lessard & Hansen, supra note 8, § 3.1B at 10. Restrictions on payments
for services rendered by foreign investors carry some potential unintended side effects.
Lessard and Hansen have identified two such drawbacks: (1) they "can place both the local
firm and MNC [multinational corporation] subsidiaries at a disadvantage in world markets
relative to firms based elsewhere because comparable local services are often not available
at reasonable costs;" and (2) "these restrictions tend to favor the MNC over the local firm
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Foreign investors in Cameroon may transfer to their countries
of residence, in the currency in which they made the investment, div-
idends and proceeds of all kinds realized from invested capital, from
the winding up of their properties, or from the sale of assets.154 The
Ivorian Code also imposes no restrictions on capital repatriation.
Article 9 is clear that foreign businesses may repatriate the earnings
and proceeds from liquidation of capital investments made in foreign
currencies to their country of origin.' 55
As in Cameroon and C6te d'Ivoire, foreign enterprises in Zaire
are guaranteed the right to transfer: (1) dividends and income gener-
ated by dividends reinvested in Zaire; (2) royalties, principal, inter-
est, and related charges to be paid by a Zairian enterprise; and (3)
any expropriation indemnity due to a foreigner. 156 Kenya requires
prior exchange control approval before royalties and management
fees can be remitted abroad. This approval must be secured annu-
ally and the foreign investor is also required to submit an application
to the Kenyan Central Bank for each payment. The approval process
is idiosyncratic and subject to the vagaries of Kenya's foreign ex-
change position. 157
F. Performance Requirements
Two significant findings come out of recent empirical studies on
the determinants of foreign investment in both the developing and
developed countries. First, performance requirements together with
investment disincentives weigh into a firm's investment decision.
Second, foreign investors give greater consideration to these re-
quirements than to incentives offered by the host-government. 58
Performance requirements are either explicit or implicit, and they
operate as a quid pro quo for the foreign investor's right of access to
since the MNC is more able to evade restrictions on payment for foreign services than is a
local firm which must acquire them locally or on an arms-length basis." Id.
154 Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 9.
155 C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 9.
156 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, arts. 32-34.
157 See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 12.
158 See, e.g., Mason, The International Food Processing Industry, in INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 56, 83 (S. Guisinger ed. 1985). This study of eight ma-
jor food processing industries found that foreign investors believe that performance re-
quirements reduce efficiency and, hence, profitability. Id. at 87. It bears noting that
several such studies have been conducted; in addition to Mason's on the food manufactur-
ing industry, see Hood & Young, The Automobile Industry, in INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 96 (S. Guisinger ed. 1985); Miller, Computers, in INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 168 (S. Guisinger ed. 1985); Gray & Walter,
The Petrochemical Industry, in INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 237
(S. Guisinger ed. 1985). In all, more than 30 firms were interviewed, from which more
than 70 investment decisions spread over 20 host countries were selected. See Guisinger,
supra note 32, at ix. For the proposition that foreign investors attach less importance to
heavy incentive schemes, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 4 (1987).
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the host country market. These requirements include trade-related
requirements (where either a minimum value of exports must be
maintained or the investor must include a minimum amount of do-
mestic content in its product), and workforce indigenization and job
creation requirements (where the foreign investor is required to
meet certain specified employment levels). The focus here is on lo-
cal content and trade-related performance requirements since these
tend to affect both domestic and international trade patterns.' 5 9
1. Local, Content Requirement
In Cameroon and Zaire, eligibility for some benefits under the
investment regime is related to the local content of the finished
product. Articles 23, 25, 27, and 30 of the Cameroon Investment
Code provide that Schedule A, B, C, and D undertakings will receive
a reduced rate of five percent for import duties and taxes, and ex-
emption from duties and taxes levied on local purchases of: (1)
equipment, materials, machines, and tools directly necessary for the
manufacturing and processing of products; (2) parts or spare parts
clearly recognizable as belonging to the aforementioned equipment;
(3) raw materials or products wholly or partially used to make the
finished or manufactured products; and (4) disposable raw materials
or products intended for packaging or wrapping the finished manu-
factured product.' 60
The Zaire Investment Code also uses local content as an induce-
ment and not as a disincentive. Article 11 grants total exemption
from duties and taxes on imports if the required goods cannot be
manufactured in Zaire, or the before-price tax of the same goods
produced locally is more than ten percent higher than the delivered
price of the identical imported product. 161 In addition, an approved
enterprise may benefit indirectly from lower prices on capital goods
and industrial inputs produced in Zaire by an enterprise that is ex-
empted from all indirect taxes and para-fiscal taxes associated with
the production of these goods. 162 The Department of National
Economy and Industry annually compiles a list of capital goods and
industrial inputs produced in Zaire which is distributed to investors
by the Investment Commission.' 6 3 This is clearly an effective way to
link local businesses with foreign investors in a mutually beneficial
arrangement.
159 See Guisinger, supra note 32, at 54.
160 Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, arts. 23, 25, 27 & 30.
161 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 11. These restrictions have been criti-
cized for being too inflexible such that they are likely "to give rise to situations that would
render an otherwise attractive investment nonviable." Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note
10, at 131.
162 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 12.
163 Id. art. 13.
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In contrast to the Zaire and Cameroon Codes where the benefits
of using local products are clear, C6te d'Ivoire's Code requires a
commitment from priority enterprises to utilize local raw materials,
products, and services as long as they are competitive as to quality,
price, and availability with equivalent goods of foreign origin. 64
The Code does not stipulate any local content percentages.
Kenya does not impose a minimum local content requirement,
except for vehicle assembly, 165 although ad hoc specifications on lo-
cal content are sometimes written into investment agreements nego-
tiated between foreign investors and the government. 166 Indeed,
many foreign investors now recognize that it is good business strat-
egy to include local content in their proposals to win "points with the
government and [its inclusion] is also useful in working with the
price-control system ... [making it] ... also easier to obtain export
licenses for raw materials or intermediate goods than for finished
products."167
The Kenya Investment Code also imposes specific performance-
type requirements in the manufacturing under bond program, a pro-
gram which encourages manufacturing for world-wide exports.' 68
To qualify for this program a firm (foreign or domestic) must export
all of its output.' 6 9 Benefits include exemption from export taxes
and levies, customs duties, and sales taxes on plant, machinery and
equipment, raw materials, components, and any other imported raw
materials.
2. Export Requirements
None of the countries impose a requirement for export perform-
ance, but Article 12 of the Cameroon Investment Code exempts
from export duties industrial products intended for export irrespec-
tive of the Schedule. ' 70 Depending on the circumstances, however,
export duties may be imposed on a given product on the recommen-
dation of the government services concerned.17' Under the Zairian
Code "[a]pproved projects intending to export all or part of their
processed or semi-processed production under conditions favorable
to the country's balance of payments situation are exempted from
164 C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 13.
165 See INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, 2 INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO KENYA 3 (1989).
166 See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 7. The current industry rate to which most foreign
enterprises adhere is 30% though the automobile-assembly sector has been able to negoti-
ate a 20% local content requirement in their investment agreements. The government, on
the other hand, would like to raise this floor to about 40%. Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 3, 6.
170 Cameroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 12(1).
'71 d. art. 12(2).
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export duties and taxes."' 72
3. Import Restrictions
Import controls traditionally regulate foreign exchange expend-
itures and protect local industry. These twin purposes are very much
evident in the import controls imposed by the countries under study.
In Kenya, Cameroon, and Zaire, import duties are relaxed and spe-
cial rates and exemptions granted for foreign enterprises using local
raw materials and products. 173
The Ivorian Investment Code grants customs duty exemptions
to materials and equipment needed for the investment, 174 provided
that materials and equipment of equivalent price and quality are not
manufactured in C6te d'Ivoire or are not available.' 75 Replacement
parts for such equipment are exempted from ten percent to thirty
percent of the value of the equipment, depending on the geographic
location of the investment.' 76 Vehicles used to transport people,
merchandise, or personal effects are not exempted from customs
duties. 177
In Kenya, import restrictions are directly tied to exchange con-
trols. First, all imports require a license from the Ministry of Com-
merce.' 78 Licenses will not be granted for importation of goods
available locally-such as private automobiles and textiles179-or
goods that are not essential to the country's manufacturing industry
or the general well-being of its population.' 80 Since import restric-
tions and foreign exchange controls are inextricably interwoven,3 8'
an importer who obtains an import license must also obtain a permit
from the Central Bank of Kenya assuring a foreign exchange alloca-
tion.1 8 2 Imported goods with an invoice value of Ksh 40,000183 may
be required to undergo a quality and quantity inspection by the cen-
tral superintendent. 18 4
172 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 16.
173 See supra notes 154-164 and accompanying text.
174 C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 17.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 20.
179 The government has banned the importation of personal motor vehicles and tex-
tiles-the latter in a 1984 ministerial ruling-in a move clearly designed to protect local
industry. See ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 21.
180 Id.
181 The imposition of import controls has been prompted by the need to conserve
foreign currency. Id. at 14.
182 See INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, 2 INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO KENYA 22-3 (1989).
183 The 1989 exchange rate was Ksh I for U.S. $0.06.
184 INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, 2 INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO KENYA 23 (1989).
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G. Fiscal Incentives
Fiscal incentives are widely used by host developing countries to
attract private foreign investment even though their effectiveness is
open to question.' 8 5 Following Shah and Toye,' 8 6 fiscal incentive
schemes are grouped under four headings. Group 1 includes tax
holidays (total or partial exemption of foreign businesses from direct
taxation for a specified period), loss carry-overs, and exemption of
royalties, dividends, and interest from taxes. Group 2 fiscal incen-
tives include accelerated depreciation allowances allowing the write-
down of a foreign company's asset for tax purposes faster than would
be possible under normal accounting depreciation rules, and tax
credits, investment allowances, and development rebates. Included
in Group 3 fiscal incentives are import duty exemptions, in the form
of either a waiver of duties, or a rebate of duty paid on imported raw
materials and capital goods. Investment grants comprise the final
group of fiscal incentives. Group 1 incentives are the most widely
used in all four countries, followed in frequency by Group 2 incen-
tives; investment grants are rarely employed.
1. Group One Incentives
a. Tax Holidays and Carry-Over Provisions
The Ivorian Investment Code contains the most generous tax
holidays of the four codes. At the other extreme is Kenya's Income
Tax Act of 1973 which imposes a forty-five percent corporate tax 187
on all Kenyan registered and incorporated companies, both local and
foreign. 188 Between these two extremes lie Cameroon and Zaire.
Foreign businesses in C6te d'Ivoire that qualify as priority enter-
prises 189 are exempt from the prevailing corporate tax for five to
185 For a critique of fiscal incentive schemes, see Hadari, The Role of Tax Incentives in
Attracting Foreign Investments in Selected Developing Countries and the Desirable Policy, 24 INT'L
LAw. 121 (1990); S. SURREY & P. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURE (1985); Yelpaala, The Effi-
cacy of Tax Incentives Within The Framework of the Neoclassical Theory of Foreign Direct Investment:
A Legislative Policy Analysis, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 365 (1984); Shah & Toye, Fiscal Incentives for
Firms in Some Developing Countries, in TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 269 (J. Toye
ed. 1978); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
186 Shah & Toye, supra note 185, at 271-72.
187 Mining companies that are engaged in mining specified minerals pay a corporate
tax of 27.5% for the first five years and 45% thereafter. The corporate tax for resident
insurance companies is at the rate of 40% on income from life insurance business.
ToUCHE Ross, supra note 11, at Kenya-31.
188 See INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, 2 INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO KENYA 25 (1989).
189 The following categories of enterprises are eligible for priority status: (1) real es-
tate; (2) industrial crops and related processing industries, including oilseeds, rubber, and
sugar cane; .(3) industrial preparation or processing by mechanical or chemical means of
such local vegetable and animal products as coffee, cocoa, cotton, and timber; (4) manu-
facturing and assembling goods and articles for large scale consumption, including tex-
tiles, building materials, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals; (5) extractive industries, such as
mining, enriching or processing of minerals and related handling and transport industries,
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twenty-five years. The Ivorian Code also allows a further period of
three years after the tax holiday during which losses incurred in the
tax holiday period can be used to offset future, otherwise taxable,
profits.' 90 Companies involved in the exploration and exploitation
of oil deposits may carry forward losses indefinitely. 19 In addition,
losses arising from depreciation can be carried forward without
limitation. ' 9 2
Under Cameroon's General Tax Code, foreign enterprises are
exempt from corporate taxes' 93 for two years;' 94 thereafter the mini-
mum corporate tax 95 must be paid even if losses are incurred -unless
a specific exemption is granted. Much as in C6te d'Ivoire, losses can
be carried forward three years, but there is no carry-back provision,
and losses may not be transferred from one entity to another in the
event of a corporate reorganization. 196
Kenya, alone among the Four Darlings, rejects the use of tax
holidays to attract foreign investments. The government's position
is that
[i]nvestors with projects that contribute to Kenya's development
goals should be able to earn attractive profits without any special tax
incentives. Thus tax holidays, special depreciation rules, customs
duty and sales tax remissions, and other special tax treatment will
generally not be used to promote investment. 197
Kenya has found these tax incentives to be costly to the govern-
ment and of uncertain benefit in attracting foreign investment. With
respect to loss carry-forward provisions, however, Kenya provides its
foreign investors with a relatively more generous package than the
other three countries, as an eligible company may carry forward its
business losses against future profits of the business indefinitely.19 8
To qualify for this tax break, the company's losses must come from
any one of three "specified sources," i.e., rental, agriculture and sim-
ilar activities, or employment.' 99 Furthermore, a loss may be offset
only against current and subsequent profits derived from the same
and oil prospecting; (6) power production; and (7) tourism (covered by special Law
73/368 of July 1973). W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at Ivory Coast-2.
190 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 11, at 1-86.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 This provision applies only if the business is sustaining losses. TOUCHE Ross, supra
note 11, at Cameroon-5.
194 The duration of this holiday is eight years for small- and medium-size firms. Cam-
eroon Investment Code, supra note 34, art. 27. Investments that are located outside areas
with a high industrial concentration may have the duration of the tax holiday extended to
15 years. d. art. 28.
195 The effective rate is 38.5% (a corporate tax levied at a flat rate of 35% plus a local
surcharge of 10% of the company tax). TOUCHE Ross, supra note 11, at Cameroon-19.
196 Id.
197 1986 Sessional Paper, supra note 43, § 6.23 at 98.
198 TOUCHE Ross, supra note 11, at Kenya-30.
'99 Id.
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category of income. 200
Fiscal incentives under the Zaire scheme are conditioned by the
preferential regime under which the investment was admitted. 20'
Approved investments under the General Regime are exempt from
the tax on stated capital or any subsequent increase in capital for a
maximum period of five years. 20 2 Under the Conventional Regime,
where investors negotiate with the Investment Commission for
broader concessions, which once granted are valid for a maximum of
ten years, approved investments can be exempt from the tax on
stated capital for at least ten years. 203 Losses can be carried forward
under the Zaire scheme to offset the taxable income of the two suc-
ceeding years, but no carry-back is permitted. 20 4
b. Tax Treatment of Dividends, Royalties, Interest, and
Profits
In a marked departure from a trend observed in many develop-
ing countries in which tax holidays are usually accompanied by ex-
emptions on dividends, 20 5 none of the four countries exempts
distributed dividends or, for that matter, royalties from tax liability
unless a tax treaty applies. 206 In Cameroon, royalties and interest
paid to undertakings within the UDEAC 20 7 states are deductible if
reasonable. Interest on capital borrowed for business purposes is
200 Id. Losses from other sources, if they occur, are not deductible from any other
income arising in the same year.
201 The Code establishes three preferential regimes: the General Regime, the Conven-
tional Regime, and the Industrial Free Zone Regime. Zaire Investment Code, supra -note
37, art. 2; see also supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
202 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 9. This provision has raised some inter-
pretational problems since it is not clear whether it applies to all or certain forms of busi-
ness organizations. The position of the Investment Commission is that only a joint stock
company, i.e., Sociiti par Actions d Responsabiliti Limitie (SARL), can take advantage of the
Article 9 exemption. Mitchell & Gittleman, on the other hand, contend that the Commis-
sion's interpretion of the provision is not supported by the text of the statute and that it
applies to an SARL as well as a limited liability company, SociitiiPrivie d ResponsabilitieLimitae
(SPRL). Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 10, at 129-30. For a discussion of the various
forms of business organizations in Zaire, see Gittleman, supra note 10, at 264-69.
203 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 29.
204 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 11, at Z-6.
205 Previous studies on fiscal incentives found that countries that offered tax holidays
almost always exempt dividends and royalties from withholding taxes. See, e.g., Shah &
Toye, supra note 185, at 279; Ahmad, Incentive Taxation for Economic and Social Development,
11 PAKISTAN ECON. & Soc. REV. 154 (1973).
206 C6te d'Ivoire has entered into tax agreements for the relief from double taxation
on income arising in C6te d'Ivoire with France, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Canada, the
United Kingdom, and those African countries that are members of the OCAM Agreement.
See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 11, at 1-80. Kenya has double taxation treaties with
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Zambia. Id. at K-
5.
207 UDEAC stands for L 'Union Douaniire et Economique de lAfrique Central. It was created
by a treaty entered into on December 8, 1964, between Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville,
Gabon, and the Central African Republic. Equatorial Guinea was admitted as a member
on December 18, 1982.
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deductible, but interest on loans by shareholders that exceed their
equity holding is deductible only up to a limit of two percent above
the lending rate of the Central Bank at the time the interest pay-
ments were calculated. 208 In addition, interest on loans to a public
or private limited liability company by shareholders who are attor-
neys or officers of the company is deductible only to the extent that
such loans do not exceed,- for all the shareholders, fifty percent of the
paid-in capital of the company. 20 9
Dividends distributed to shareholders of foreign companies op-
erating in C6te d'Ivoire are subject to a twelve percent withholding
tax.210 Royalties and technical or administrative assistance fees paid
to non-residents are subject to a twenty-five percent withholding tax
on eighty percent of the foreign company's total income. 2 11 To pre-
vent double taxation, the Code allows for the deduction of some op-
erational costs, such as: (1) the net land income derived from the
realty assets of a company; (2) "the net income of capital and stock
shown on the assets of the enterprise and previously taxed on the
income of transferable securities after expenses" and from ten to
thirty percent "of charges fixed by contract depending on the invest-
ment participation or indebtedness in the balance sheet subject to a
limitation of fifty percent of the firm's capital; '2 12 (3) provisions for
equipment and tool renewal; and (4) provisions for the restoration of
deposits. 213
Dividends distributed to shareholders by a Kenyan company
(foreign- or local-owned) are subject to a fifteen percent withholding
tax, deducted at source, if the recipient resident company controls
less than 12.5% of the voting stock of the distributing company, and
if the dividend is part of the investment income of the life fund of a
resident insurance company. 214 The Kenya Income Tax Act does
not provide any special rules regarding the deductibility of royal-
ties, 215 but in practice a deduction for royalties paid to non-residents
will be allowed if withholding tax has been applied.216 Interest ex-
penses are also deductible, but only if the debt was wholly and exclu-
sively contracted to produce taxable income. Interest on debt
incurred to finance loans to directors is not deductible.2 17
208 TOUCHE Ross, supra note 11, at Cameroon-17.
209 Id.
210 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 11, at 1-82 to -83.
211 Id.
212 W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at Ivory Coast-20.
213 Id.
214 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, Supra note 11, at K-6.
215 According to one knowledgeable source, interest, in theory, "is not deductible un-
til any necessary withholding tax is accounted for. However, by concession, this require-
ment is normally waived provided. evidence of payment after the end of the relevant
accounting period can be produced." TOUCHE Ross, supra note 12, at Kenya-28.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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The Zairian scheme targets tax exemptions according to the
preferential regime under which the investment has been admitted.
For instance, approved investments under the General Regime and
in the Special Regime for Small and Medium Enterprises and Indus-
tries are exempt from the tax on profits2 18 for two to five years de-
pending on the location of the investments. 219 Dividends paid to
holders of new shares issued by approved companies are also ex-
empted from the tax on revenues derived from capital assets. 220 The
Zaire code also divides investments into new and existing invest-
ments, each receiving a different mix of tax exemptions. Under Arti-
cle 18 of the investment code, for example, new approved
enterprises are totally exempted from the tax on profits. 22 1 Existing
enterprises are granted a tax credit which is deducted from the taxes
on profits due during the five fiscal years following the date of their
approval. 222 The tax credit can never exceed thirty percent of the
total amount of the approved investment. 223
2. Group Two Incentives
a. Accelerated Depreciation Allowances
All four countries operate accelerated depreciation and other
tax credit schemes for the benefit of foreign investors. Cameroon
permits most foreign establishments with a turnover of 200 million
francs CFA to revalue their fixed assets, and then to accelerate the
depreciation of the revalued fixed assets. This is a one-time allow-
ance and applies to enterprises in existence prior to 1985.224 In
Kenya, wear and tear allowances are granted in lieu of depreciation
on a company's assets, usually machinery. 225 The depreciation rates
vary depending on the class of machinery,2 26 and the allowance can
be claimed for the whole year in the year of purchase of the asset. It
is noted that
[i]n any subsequent year, a whole year's allowance can be claimed
even though the asset may not have been used for some months dur-
ing that year. In the year of disposal, no allowance can be claimed;
218 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 18.
219 Id. Investments located in Economic Zone A enjoy the exemption from the tax on
profits for a duration of five years and those in Economic Zone B enjoy the same benefits
but for only 2 years.
220 Id. art. 9.
221 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 18.
222 Id. art. 19.
223 Id. Articles 20 and 21 set forth the bases upon which the tax credit is computed.
224 TouCHE Ross, supra note 11, at Cameroon-5.
225 This is not defined but in practice includes vehicles, ships, equipment, tools, furni-
ture, fixtures, and fittings.
226 For instance, class I machinery, i.e., heavy self-propelling machines such as trac-
tors, combine harvesters, earth-moving equipment, and so on, are allowed a wear-and-tear
allowance of 37.5%; class II machinery, 25%; and class III machinery 12.5%. TOUCHE
Ross, supra note 11, at Kenya-25.
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the proceeds of disposal reduce the balance on which future wear
and tear allowance can be claimed.
22 7
In C6te d'Ivoire, accelerated depreciation, allowed at double the
normal rate, can be extended on a straight line basis to new equip-
ment and machinery used exclusively by the foreign enterprise for
industrial operations with a normal life of over five years. 228 Foreign
employers are also allowed forty percent accelerated depreciation on
the cost of construction for housing employees. To qualify for this
allowance "certain health and safety standards [must be] met and...
the annual depreciation over the normal life of the buildings is
reduced." 2 29
In Zaire, investments by small and medium enterprises admitted
to the General Regime are authorized to calculate depreciation ac-
cording to an accelerated rate such that three quarters of the value of
equipment is amortized after half of its life expectancy. 230 Given the
absence of standard rates of depreciation in the tax law, in practice
the annual rates generally accepted by the authorities range from a
low of 2.5% for buildings to a high of 25% for automobiles.2 31
b. Investment Allowances
Kenya grants incentives in the form of investment allowances for
geographical location of the investment. 2 32 The scheme is designed
to spur industrial growth in the rural areas and to encourage the di-
versification of development projects.2 3 3 Consistent with this objec-
tive, investments outside Nairobi and Mombasa are eligible for a
one-time deduction equal to fifty percent of the cost of plant, ma-
chinery, buildings, and equipment, thus reducing income taxes in the
early years of a project.2 3 4 This contrasts with the twenty percent
rate for new investments located in Nairobi and Mombasa. 23 5 The
227 Id.
228 See W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at Ivory Coast-20 to -21.
229 Id. at Ivory Coast-21.
230 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 24.
231 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 11, at Z-5. Plant, equipment, furniture, fix-
tures, and fittings can be depreciated at the rate of 10-15%. Id.
232 See 1986 Sessional Paper, supra note 43, § 6.24, at 98.
233 INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, 2 INVESTOR'S GuIDE To KENYA 7 (1989). It would
appear that the policy of using locational incentives to induce foreign investments in non-
urban areas is prompted by Kenya's demographic realities. Kenya is projected to have a
population of 35 million people by the end of the century, 78% more than lived in Kenya
in 1984; the work force will more than double from 6.5 million to 14 million and between
9 to 10 million inhabitants will be added to the urban population. To accommodate this
rising population and to stem the flow of migration from rural to urban areas, a policy of
creating jobs in the secondary towns and smaller urban centers becomes an imperative:
"Unless new workers can be attracted in large numbers to jobs in the smaller urban cen-
tres and on prosperous farms, it will be necessary to build at least six cities the size of
present-day Nairobi, or watch Mombasa and Nairobi expand into cities of two to four mil-
lion each." 1986 Sessional Paper, supra note 43, § 1.1, at 1.
234 Id. § 6.24, at 98.
235 Id.
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government estimates that under typical circumstances these al-
lowances, discounted over the life of the investments, are the
equivalent of a ten percent subsidy of the initial cost of the invest-
ment. 23 6 For manufacturers under bond, there is an investment al-
lowance of 100 percent regardless of the location.
In Zaire, investments by existing enterprises are allowed an in-
vestment tax credit that is deducted from the taxes on profits earned
by the enterprise during the five fiscal years from the date of decree
approving the investment.237
3. Group Three Incentives
a. Import Duty Exemptions
Cameroon law exempts from import duties all specially ap-
proved industrial enterprises on the Schedule of Internal Tax on
Production. These enterprises are required to pay a tax at the rate
determined by the instrument placing them under the schedule. 238
In addition to import duty concessions, goods produced by the spe-
cially-approved enterprises are exempted from the internal tax on
production, and enjoy a reduced rate of export duty for an indefinite
period. To qualify for this special treatment239 the enterprise must
be engaged in an industry sector which contributes to Cameroon's
economic development, have a high level of investment, and have a
job creation program.2 40
The Customs Code also provides for the temporary importation
.under bond of specialized equipment needed for a particular project.
The import duty is waived if the equipment is reexported within a
specified period. 241 Under the Tourism Code, certain categories of
businesses that are involved in the hotel and tourist trade are
granted reduced import duty.24 2
Kenya exempts imported plant and machinery from customs
duty and other import taxation up to a maximum CIF value of Ksh
10 million, if the equipment is intended for small-scale industries es-
tablished outside of major cities. 243 Special concessions are reserved
for industries located more than twenty kilometers outside the
boundaries of Nairobi and Mombasa but within a ten kilometer ra-
dius of towns with a population of more than 20,000 inhabitants, as
Well as for industries located in towns with a population of less than
236 Id.
237 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 19.
238 TOUCHE Ross, supra note I1, at Cameroon-4.
239 Application to be placed on this schedule may -be made to the President of the
Republic through the Minister of Finance. Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 5.
243 INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE, 2 INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO KENYA 6-7 (1989).
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20,000.244 The former industries enjoy a fifty percent remission of
duties and tax; the latter are accorded a complete duty exemption. 245
In Zaire, approved investments under the General Regime are
exempt from import duties on the machines, plant, and equipment
required for the project provided the equipment is new, and local
industry is unable to supply it at the same quality and price. 246 Small
and medium enterprises or industries admitted to the General Re-
gime enjoy total exemption from import duties and taxes (excluding
the administrative tax) for machines, tools, initial spare parts, indus-
trial inputs, and materials necessary for implementing the invest-
ment.247 In addition, enterprises may deduct expenses incurred
training the manager of the enterprise or its personnel. 248
H. Guarantees Against Expropriation
Investor confidence in the host country remains perhaps the
most important determinant in the investment decision. One way to
inspire such confidence is for the host country to provide the foreign
investor guarantees against expropriation of foreign-owned busi-
nesses. Such guarantees can take the form of constitutional provi-
sions or by incorporation into the investment code. Whether these
guarantees are sufficient to allay investors' fears of expropriation is
yet to be determined. Investors will want to know that, in the event
of nationalization, investors will be compensated and, if so, by what
standard. The debate over appropriate standards for compensation
following an involuntary taking of foreign-owned property is not
new, and it is one that finds the Third World and the industrialized
states on opposite sides of the question.249 The latter, under United
States leadership, take the position that "prompt, adequate, and ef-
fective compensation" is the only just and reasonable standard of
compensation for the expropriation of alien property. 250 For this
group of states, this standard represents positive international law
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 11. This exemption "is also limited to
goods that cannot be manufactured in Zaire or to those cases where local goods are at
least ten percent more expensive in Zaire than the identical delivered product manufac-
tured outside of Zaire." Mitchell & Gittleman, supra note 10, at 131.
247 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, arts. 23, 27(1), 31(1).
248 Id. art. 24.
249 For a review of the contending positions, see Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized
Property in International Law: Toward a Consensus or More "Rich Chaos "?, in 3 THE VALUATION
OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 183 (R. Lillich ed. 1975); Fatouros,
International Law and the Third World, 50 VA. L. REV. 783 (1964).
250 This is the so-called "Hull Formula" named after the U.S. Secretary of State,
Cordell Hull, who first articulated the standard in response to the Mexican government's
expropriation of American-owned companies operating in that country. The 1938 expro-
priation provoked a voluminous exchange of diplomatic notes between Secretary Hull and
his Mexican counterpart, Foreign Minister Eduardo Hall. See generally Vandevelde, The Bi-
lateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 231 & n.200.
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on expropriation compensation.2 5 '
The Third World states uniformly reject this Western-spon-
sored interpretation of international law in favor of one which
removes the issue of compensation from the province of interna-
tional law. 25 2 Proceeding from a position first taken by Mexico, the
developing states advocate the principle of "national treatment" or
the "equality of treatment" standard.253 It holds that states are
bound to treat the property of aliens in substantially the same man-
ner in which they treat the property of their own nationals. 254 If
aliens are not to be accorded more favorable treatment than nation-
als, it follows that all questions relating to the issue of compensation
ought to be settled in accordance with the laws of the expropriating
state. Anything short of this would treat aliens as a privileged group,
according to them privileges denied nationals.
The doctrine of equality of treatment is reflected in the constitu-
tion and investment code of two of the countries surveyed here. The
constitution of Cameroon provides that "[n]o one shall be deprived
[of their property] save for public purposes and subject to the pay-
ment of compensation to be determined by the law." 255 Under the
Ivorian Investment Code, foreign investors are guaranteed treat-
ment identical to that given to nationals. 256 In contrast, the guaran-
tees against expropriation found in the Kenyan and Zairian codes are
much closer to the Western standard, and are more comprehensive
than the guarantees contained in the investment regimes of Came-
roon and CMte d'Ivoire and several other African countries.2 57
Kenya's constitution guarantees that "[n]o property of any descrip-
tion shall be compulsorily taken possession of,"258 and in its invest-
ment code the Kenyan government again guarantees compensation
251 There has been some erosion in this position even within the United States and
voices have been raised in certain quarters, particularly from the American Law Institute,
questioning the continuing viability of the Hull formula. For an exposition of this view-
point, see Schachter, Editorial Comment, Compensation for Expropriations, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121
(1984).
252 For the Third World position on the question of compensation in cases of expro-
priation of alien property, see, e.g., Fatouros, supra note 249, at 807-11. See also Roy, Is the
Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am.J.
INT'L L. 863 (1961).
253 Fatouros, supra note 249, at 807-08.
254 Id.
255 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, Preamble. But see Treaty Con-
cerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Feb. 26, 1986,
United States-Cameroon, art. III, reprinted in ICSID, 3 INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD:
INVESTMENT TREATIES ("[E]xpropriations or nationalizations give right to prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation.").
256 C6te d'Ivoire Investment Code, supra note 35, art. 8.
257 Cf, e.g., Encouragement of Investment Act of Apr. 26, 1980 (Sudan), art. 19(a)(i)
(providing only for "just compensation"); Investment Code (Ghana), P.N.D.C. Law 116 of
July 13, 1985, art. 19, Official Gazette (July 17, 1985) (providing a guarantee against
expropriation).
258 KENYA CONSTITUTION § 75.
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for any foreign business that is the subject of compulsory acquisition
by the stare. Article 8 provides that the measure for compensation
shall be "full and prompt payment of compensation." 259 Zaire's
code provides for "just and fair compensation" in the event of
expropriation. 260
One way to test the efficacy of these guarantees is in the context
of an aggressive policy of indigenization requiring foreign investors
to divest their investments in favor of locals. Fortunately for foreign
investors, in Cameroon and 6te d'Ivoire there are no articulated
government policies favoring the transfer of foreign businesses to
nationals.26' The same, however, is not true for Kenya, but given
Kenya's spotless record on nationalization 262 and its relatively com-
prehensive guarantees against expropriation, foreign investors have
little cause to worry. Zaire, on the other hand, flirted briefly with an
indigenization policy which divested foreign investors of their own-
ership interests in their Zairian operations, but retreated when the
Zairi*anization policy proved to be a monumental disaster.263 It is
most unlikely that the government would want to repeat this experi-
ence anytime soon.
III. Conclusion
The four African countries were selected for this comparative
analysis because they appear to share so many characteristics, but
appearances can be deceiving. The analysis shows that while similar-
ities are widespread at the macro-level, differences are discernible at
the micro-level. Although the Four Darlings are arguably similar on
a number of important dimensions, they are not exactly fungible.
The evidence suggests some caution is appropriate when dis-
cussing the political stability factor so as not to overstate its signifi-
cance. While it is true that all four countries have been politically
stable for a considerable stretch of time, Kenya and Zaire have ex-
perienced some fundamental changes in their investment regimes
during this same period. These changes could have been just as de-
stabilizing as, say, frequent labor unrests, threats of coup d'etat, and
so on, the kind of events that are immediately associated with polit-
ical instability in Africa. The foreign investor should be able to sepa-
rate political stability from instability in terms of the risks a particular
combination of circumstances poses to one's investment. This risk,
as Dr. Akinsanya dutifully reminds, "results largely from changes of
259 Kenya Investment Act, supra note 36, art. 8; see also KENYA CONSTITUTION § 75.
260 Zaire Investment Code, supra note 37, art. 5.
261 The Ivorian government has since the early 1980s pursued a policy of selective
privatization of state-run enterprises. INVESTMENT CLIMATE UPDATE, supra note 39, at 9.
262 No foreign companies have been nationalized in Kenya in the past 15 years. See
ILT KENYA, supra note 40, at 5.
263 See supra note 127.
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government (public) policy which may or may not be related to or
caused by domestic political disorder. ' 264 If Akinsanya is correct,
then Kenya and Zaire's outwardly stable political systems may belie
the far-reaching internal investment policy changes that have taken
place. From the perspective of a foreign investor, these changes in-
crease the risks of investing in those countries.
The comparative analysis of investment laws and regulations
points to important policy differences with respect to how the four
governments have approached the matter of creating a hospitable
investment environment. Kenya, for instance, has one of the most
restrictive exchange regulations governing imports and the repatria-
tion of capital among the four countries in this survey, and is alone in
rejecting tax holidays as a device to attract foreign, investment.
Kenya believes instead that a sound, dynamic economy backed by
stable political conditions are all that is needed to attract foreign in-
vestors. True to its image of a state organized around a presidential
monarch, Zaire requires presidential approval for admission of for-
eign investments to its several preferential investment regimes,
notwithstanding provisions in the investment code delegiting this
authority to other state organs. Uncharacteristically for countries
blithely dismissed as the chasses gard&es of West European (viz.,
French) business interests, Cameroon and C6te d'Ivoire embrace the
more defiant Third World compensation standard. Zaire and Kenya,
on the other hand, are much closer to the West on this issue. De-
spite these differences, the Four Darlings are among the African
countries which can credibly boast of having attractive investment
climates.2 65 If one were to place their respective investment regimes
on a continuum of liberalness, Cameroon's and C6te d'Ivoire's
would be the most liberal, Kenya's the least, while Zaire's lies some-
where in between.
263 A. AKINSANYA, MULTINATIONALS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: A STUDY OF Busi-
NEss-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD 252 (1984).
. 265 Those who have previously examined the investment codes of these four countries
have found them to be quite liberal. See, e.g., Ngongi, supra note 43; Sams, The Legal Aspects
of Doing Business in Cameroon, 17 INT'L LAW. 489 (1983); Woods, supra note 18; Rweyemamu,
supra note 117; Gittleman & Mitchell, supra note 10.
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